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THE EXPRESSIVE SYNERGIES OF THE 
VOLCKER RULE 
Onnig H. Dombalagian* 
Abstract: In this Article, I propose an implementation of the Volcker 
Rule that balances the statutory mandate to promote the safety and 
soundness of U.S. banking organizations with the significant role that 
bank-affiliated dealers currently play as providers of liquidity in over-the-
counter markets. The Volcker Rule restricts the proprietary trading activi-
ties of U.S. banks and their affiliates subject to exemptions for traditional 
banking activities and certain “client-oriented” activities. This Article 
draws upon the academic literature regarding expressive law, the history 
of federal banking legislation, and the text of the Dodd-Frank Act to ar-
gue that federal financial regulators have the discretion to implement the 
Rule’s exemption for “market-making-related activities” to realize syner-
gies with Dodd-Frank’s initiatives in the regulation of over-the-counter 
markets. Specifically, I envision that the market making exemption could 
be implemented with a view to encouraging the provision of liquidity to 
competitive trading facilities. I further argue that such an implementa-
tion may well be essential to the vitality of the Volcker Rule, in light of the 
political forces aligned in favor of the Rule’s repeal. 
Introduction 
 The Volcker Rule (the “Rule”)1 is unquestionably one of the more 
controversial provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).2 The Rule restricts 
U.S. depository institutions and their affiliates from engaging in pro-
prietary trading, subject to certain enumerated exemptions, and limits 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2013, Onnig H. Dombalagian, George Denègre Professor of Law, Tulane Univer-
sity Law School. I am extremely grateful to Roberta Karmel, Stephen F. Williams, Felix 
Chang, Stanislav Dolgopolov, Eric Pan, Erik Gerding, David Zaring, Saule Omarova, my 
colleagues Claire Dickerson and Adam Feibelman, the participants at the Brooklyn Law 
School Financial Scholars Roundtable, at the annual meetings of the Canadian Law and 
Economics Association, and in the Tulane Law School internal speaker series who offered 
comments on prior drafts of this Article. I would also like to extend enormous gratitude to 
my research assistant, Matthew Amoss, for assistance above and beyond the call of duty, 
and to my administrative assistant, Toni Mochetta. All errors are mine. 
1 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2010). 
2 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
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their sponsorship of and investment in hedge funds and other private 
funds.3 The Rule reflects the view of Paul Volcker, chairman emeritus 
of the Group of Thirty and former chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB), that systemically important banking institutions should 
not undertake proprietary activities that entail high risks and pose seri-
ous conflicts of interest.4 Although scholars debate whether proprietary 
trading was the precipitating cause of the recent crisis, it is difficult to 
deny that speculative trading activity exacerbated losses in connection 
with the securitization and related derivatives activities that contributed 
to the recent collapse of the financial sector.5 
 The Rule is often framed as a compromise between the segrega-
tion of commercial and investment banking established by the Glass-
Steagall Act of 19336 and the permissive affiliations permitted by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.7 Supporters and opponents of the 
Rule’s premise are exerting enormous pressure on federal financial 
regulators as they struggle to find a practicable implementation of its 
prohibitions and exemptions.8 Supporters of an aggressive implemen-
tation of the Rule generally contend that the U.S. government should 
never again be forced to cover losses sustained by financial institutions 
that result from morally hazardous speculative trading—thereby ena-
bling such institutions to reap profits from aggressive trading activity 
while shifting losses to taxpayers.9 As argued by the Rule’s sponsors in 
                                                                                                                      
3 12 U.S.C. § 1851. 
4 See Grp. of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability 28 
(2009), available at http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial_Reform-A_Framework_for_ 
Financial_Stability.pdf. 
5 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and Scofflaws, 81 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–11), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101109 
(summarizing views as to the role played by proprietary trading in the financial crisis); 
Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39, 
41–42 & nn.6–12 (2011) (same). 
6 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12, 15, and 39 U.S.C.). 
7 Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
8 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial 
Reform 25–29 (Mar. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431 
(analyzing the comments received by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) in 
advance of its study regarding implementation of the Rule). 
9 See, e.g., Comments on Proposed Rule: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary 
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity 
Funds, File No. S7-41-11, Sec. & Exch. Commission, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
41-11/s74111.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (collecting over 15,000 form letters support-
ing implementation of a “strong Volcker Rule” that would “ban big banks from exposing 
consumers and taxpayers to risky proprietary trades”). 
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Congress, Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin, banking entities should 
only engage in those kinds of proprietary trading that represent “client-
oriented, risk-reducing, or other traditional banking activities that fa-
cilitate the formation and deployment of capital.”10 
 Supporters of a more lenient approach claim that an “incorrect” 
implementation of the Rule could result in “decreased liquidity, higher 
costs for issuers, reduced returns on investments and increased risk to 
corporations wishing to hedge their commercial activities.”11 One in-
dustry study estimates that the impact of the Rule on issuers and inves-
tors in corporate bonds alone could cost up to $350 billion.12 Even 
though final rules have yet to be adopted, banks are already beginning 
to suffer a significant loss of reputational and human capital.13 At least 
one rating agency has published negative rating outlooks on Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley in part “because of the potential adverse im-
pact of the Rule under a stricter final rule.”14 Several financial institu-
tions have begun to close or reassign their trading desks,15 and promi-
                                                                                                                      
10 Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 Harv. J. on Legis. 515, 539 
(2011). 
11 Letter from the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, the Am. Bankers Ass’n, the Fin. Ser-
vices Roundtable & The Clearing House to the Agencies 2 (Feb. 13, 2012) (No. OCC-2011-
0014-0174) [hereinafter SIFMA-ABA-TCH Letter] (discussing the views of “customers, buy-
side market participants, industrial and manufacturing businesses, treasurers of public 
companies and foreign regulators”). 
12 See Oliver Wyman, The Volcker Rule Restrictions on Proprietary Trading: Implica-
tions for the US Corporate Bond Market 2 (2011), http://www.sifma.org/workarea/down 
loadasset.aspx?id=8589936887 (evaluating the decreased value of corporate bonds, de-
creased borrowing power of corporations, and increased transaction costs to shareholders 
due to the Rule). 
13 See Scott Patterson, Volcker Rule Could Be Delayed—Again, Wall St. J. Online (Feb. 
27, 2013 4:18 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732466240457833056 
3892792982.html (describing the implications of a projected delay in final rules); Tommy 
Wilkes, Banks Move High Risk Traders Ahead of U.S. Rule, Reuters, Apr. 3, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-volckerrule-trading-idUSBRE8320GS201 20 
403 (describing shifts in traders’ employment). 
14 For U.S. Bank Ratings, The Volcker Rule’s Impact Depends on the Final Details, Standard 
& Poor’s (Oct. 22, 2012, 9:10 AM), http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/ 
en/us/?assetID=1245342365175. 
15 See, e.g., Dawn Kopecki & Chanyaporn Chanjaroen, JPMorgan Said to End Proprietary 
Trading to Meet Volcker Rule, Bloomberg News (Aug. 31, 2010, 7:53 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-31/jpmorgan-is-said-to-shut-proprietary-trading-to-comply-
with-volcker-rule.html; Michael J. Moore, Morgan Stanley Said to Consider Commodities Unit 
Sale, Bloomberg News ( June 6, 2012, 1:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
06-06/morgan-stanley-said-to-consider-commodities-unit-sale.html; Wilkes, supra note 13. 
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nent traders have defected to private funds or non-U.S. banks where 
they can continue their trading activities unabated.16 
 The federal financial regulatory agencies charged with implemen-
tation of the Rule17 have jointly proposed a uniform set of regulations, 
which focuses predominantly on promoting the safety and soundness 
of banks and their affiliates.18 As I have argued elsewhere, this narrow 
approach is unwise.19 The safety and soundness of banks and their af-
filiates is separately addressed in Dodd-Frank’s enhancements to capital 
adequacy and leverage; implementing the Rule with such a parsimoni-
ous focus undermines its independent significance as a tool of financial 
regulation and invites pressure to relax the Rule’s prohibitions as bank 
balance sheets become healthier (the fate that befell the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933).20 Indeed, even as the reelection of President Barack 
Obama is likely to have eliminated the possibility of legislative repeal in 
the near term, lobbyists continue to exert pressure on the Agencies to 
weaken the Rule,21 and the financial services industry is exploring liti-
gation as a tool for delaying its impact.22 
 More consequentially, a better rounded implementation of the 
Rule could create an opportunity to achieve synergies with Dodd-
Frank’s other objectives. To the extent that certain of the activities 
permitted under the Rule—such as “market-making-related activities” 
                                                                                                                      
16 See, e.g., Halah Touryalai, Volcker Rule Refugees, Forbes (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/03/21/volcker-rule-refugees/. 
17 Although many of the Rule’s provisions are self-executing, the federal financial reg-
ulators are required to engage in significant rulemaking to implement its provisions. 12 
U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2010). The federal financial regulators—namely, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System (“FRB” or the “Board”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”)—are hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Agencies.” 
“Commissions” refers to the SEC and the CFTC collectively. 
18 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, 
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (“Proposing Release”), 76 
Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,849 (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011); see also Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and 
Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 8331, 8332 (CFTC Feb. 14, 2012) (adopting in full the com-
mentary of the Proposing Release and making technical changes to the text of the Rule). 
19 Dombalagian, supra note 5 (manuscript at 28). 
20 See infra notes 284–286 and accompanying text. 
21 Ben Protess, Behind the Scenes, Some Lawmakers Lobby to Change the Volcker Rule, N.Y. Times 
Dealbook, Sept. 20, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/behind-the-scenes-a-
lawmaker-pushes-to-curb-the-volcker-rule/; see also supra note 17 (defining “Agencies”). 
22 Ben Protess, Judge Strikes Down a Dodd-Frank Trading Rule, N.Y. Times Dealbook, 
Sept. 28, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/judge-strikes-down-dodd-frank-
trading-rule/. 
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for over-the-counter financial instruments—are not comprehensively 
defined in federal financial legislation, the Rule offers the Agencies the 
ability to shape the structure of those markets through the Volcker Rule 
exemption.23 To be sure, the Rule does not give the Commissions (the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (CFTC)) a broad mandate to flesh out a 
market structure for over-the-counter markets.24 The SEC’s views, how-
ever, have played a significant role in discovering norms that balance 
the interests of market makers, dealers, brokers, and investors in organ-
ized markets.25 The Agencies’ implementation of the Rule could play a 
similar expressive function in over-the-counter markets—beginning 
with the rules governing swap and security-based swap execution facili-
ties under Dodd-Frank, and ultimately with respect to transactions in 
fixed-income securities and other financial instruments. 
 I argue that the Agencies should implement the Volcker Rule’s 
market-making-related activities exemption with a view to shaping the 
development of over-the-counter markets. Part I discusses the structure 
of the Rule and the relationship of its exemption for market-making-
related activities to traditional market-maker regulation.26 Part II con-
siders whether the Rule’s exemption for market-making-related activi-
ties has the expressive potential to shape market structure, even with-
out recourse to effective enforcement tools.27 Part III proposes a 
specific approach to implementing the Rule’s market making exemp-
tion in a manner that complements the Commissions’ initiatives relat-
ing to over-the-counter markets—in particular, swaps and security-based 
swaps under Dodd-Frank.28 Part IV considers whether my proposal is 
consistent with the legislative history and judicial interpretation of 
analogous provisions of federal banking legislation.29 
I. The Volcker Rule and Market Making 
 This Part summarizes the structure of the Volcker Rule’s restric-
tions on proprietary trading and considers the meaning and interpreta-
                                                                                                                      
23 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2010). 
24 See id. § 1851(b)(1) (not mentioning market structure among the expressly enu-
merated policies that the FSOC and Agencies are required to consider in implementing 
the Rule). 
25 See infra notes 183–206 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 30–140 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 141–206 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 207–249 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 250–346 and accompanying text. 
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tion of the exemption for market-making-related activities.30 The core 
policy justifications for the Rule, as described in the statute and legisla-
tive history of the Dodd-Frank Act, are traditional concerns about the 
safety and soundness of banks and their affiliates (augmented by con-
cerns about systemic risk to the financial stability of the United States) 
and the “subtle hazards” of permitting banks to affiliate with providers 
of other financial services.31 The Rule is often described as a compro-
mise between the formal separation of investment and commercial 
banking activities enforced by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the 
liberalization of affiliations between depository institutions and other 
financial companies under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.32 
 Of all the provisions of the Rule, the exemption for market-making-
related activities has perhaps drawn the most intense scrutiny.33 As de-
scribed in Sections B and C below, the crux of the problem is that the 
Agencies have defined market making based primarily on the literal text 
of the statute and the business practices of market makers in organized 
markets, without drawing upon their experience with the regulation of 
market making or the specific market structure for any particular class 
of financial instruments to define market making qualitatively.34 The 
Agencies’ proposed implementation of the exemption has therefore 
made it difficult to anticipate how the role of banking entities as dealers 
in over-the-counter fixed-income and derivatives markets will evolve in 
                                                                                                                      
30 See infra notes 31–140 and accompanying text. 
31 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(1) (Supp. IV 
2010). 
32 E.g. 156 Cong. Rec. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Christopher 
Dodd) (“The purpose of the Volcker rule is to eliminate excessive risk-taking activities by 
banks and their affiliates while at the same time preserving safe, sound investment activi-
ties that serve the public interest.”); see infra notes 250–321 and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform 
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1074 (2012) 
(noting that “hedging and market making” are chief among the Rule’s “numerous loop-
holes and exceptions”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 Or. L. Rev. 951, 1028 (2011) (describing the 
Rule’s failure to “establish a clear demarcation between prohibited ‘proprietary trading’ 
and permissible ‘market making’” as “[p]robably the most troublesome aspect of the final 
Volcker Rule”); see also Bryan Settele, The Volcker Rule’s Market Making Exemption, 31 Rev. 
Banking & Fin. L. 556, 562–67 (2012) (discussing the financial services industry’s “strong 
reaction” to the proposed regulations implementing the Rule). 
34 See infra notes 62–140 and accompanying text. 
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response to the Rule, and has led concerned parties on both sides of the 
issue to demand further refinement to the proposed rules.35 
 This disconnect is not accidental; indeed, it reflects the long-
standing difficulty of defining what “market making” means,36 whether 
on the facilities of an exchange or in the over-the-counter market. Mar-
ket making has eluded definition because there is no definitive way to 
design a market structure that requires market intermediaries to pro-
vide a reasonable expectation of liquidity while protecting them from 
insolvency. Rather, market makers’ privileges and duties must evolve 
with the needs of investors and traders. Indeed, even as financial insti-
tutions lament that the Agencies should better appreciate the contribu-
tion that their affiliates make by providing liquidity to dealers and end-
users of financial instruments, they offer no competing restrictive prin-
ciple for defining trades that provide beneficial liquidity to the market-
place.37 
A. The Volcker Rule Summarized 
 The Volcker Rule subjects U.S. depository institutions and their 
affiliates to various restrictions on the scope of their trading and in-
vestment activities.38 As envisioned by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council’s implementation study, the Rule’s ostensible purpose is to 
“promote and enhance the safety and soundness of banking entities,” 
to “reduce conflicts of interest” between supervised entities and their 
customers, and to “limit activities that have caused undue risk or loss” 
or that might reasonably be expected to cause such risk or loss in these 
entities.39 The Rule’s tone and approach, however, are essentially quali-
tative; for example, it permits only those proprietary trading activities 
that are “client-oriented,”40 and even then, only if the activities do not 
                                                                                                                      
35 Compare Coffee, supra note 33, at 1074 (discussing the loopholes for commercial 
banks under the Rule), with Oliver Wyman, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the negative 
effects of the proprietary trading ban on the value of corporate bonds). 
36 Merkley & Levin, supra note 10, at 543 (noting the difficulty of distinguishing mar-
ket making from a firm’s proprietary trading). 
37 See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Making a Theoretical Case About Volcker, N.Y. Times Dealbook, Feb. 
14, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/making-a-theoretical-case-against-vol 
cker/. 
38 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing for permitted activities and limita-
tions). 
39 Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Study & Recommendations on Prohibi-
tions on Proprietary Trading & Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds & Pri-
vate Equity Funds 8 (2011); see 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(1). 
40 Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,849 (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011). 
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themselves create material conflicts of interest or risks to the trading 
entity or the financial system as a whole.41 
 The Rule is structured as a broad prohibition against proprietary 
trading, with exemptions for certain enumerated categories of trading 
activity, which are themselves restricted by certain statutory limitations. 
The Rule begins with the imperative that a “banking entity”42 shall not 
“engage in proprietary trading” or “acquire or retain any equity, part-
nership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a 
private equity fund.”43 Proprietary trading, for these purposes, is ex-
pansively defined as “engaging as a principal for the trading account of 
the [relevant entity] in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise 
acquire or dispose of,” various financial instruments.44 The definition 
of “trading account,” however, narrows the scope of the prohibition: as 
defined in the statute, a “trading account” includes “any account used 
for acquiring or taking positions . . . for the purpose of selling in the 
near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from 
short-term price movements).”45 
 The Rule then provides a series of exemptions for various trading 
activities or fund activities in which banking entities are permitted to 
engage.46 Traditional bank securities activities, such as trading in U.S. 
government, municipal, agency- and government-sponsored enterprise 
securities, and permissible bank brokerage activity,47 as well as the sale 
                                                                                                                      
 
41 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2). 
42 Id. § 1851(h)(1). “Banking entity,” for this purpose, is defined to include all insured 
depository institutions and their subsidiaries and affiliates. Id. The FRB is empowered to 
adopt “additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative limits with regard 
to” such activity if conducted by systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) sub-
ject to FRB supervision. Id. § 1851(a)(2). 
43 Id. § 1851(a)(1). 
44 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (Supp. IV 2010). Specifically, the Rule covers 
any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any se-
curity, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, 
any option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any other security 
or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission may, by rule . . . determine. 
Id. 
45 Id. § 1851(h)(6). 
46 See id. § 1851(d) (providing exemptions for, among other things, market making 
and risk-related hedging activities). 
47 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(A), (D); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(i), (iii) (West 2012) 
(permitting banks to engage in buying and selling government and municipal securities 
that are “exempted securities” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange 
Act”) and to issue and sell asset-backed securities). The Rule also exempts proprietary 
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or securitization of loans, are allowed.48 Securities, commodities, and 
swaps affiliates may additionally engage in brokerage, underwriting, or 
market-making-related activities,49 subject to registration and regula-
tion by the appropriate federal financial regulator.50 Affiliates regulated 
as insurance companies may engage in state-regulated insurance activi-
ties.51 The Rule also permits the organization and offering of private 
equity or hedge funds, as well as the performance of certain services for 
such funds by the bank and its affiliates.52 
 Beyond such activities, the Rule permits only a few additional cate-
gories of trading activity.53 Banking entities are permitted to enter into 
“risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with and related to in-
dividual or aggregated positions, contracts, or other holdings” resulting 
from otherwise permissible activities.54 Certain small business and pub-
lic welfare investments and certain non-U.S. proprietary trading and 
fund activity undertaken by banking organizations not controlled by a 
U.S. banking entity are also permitted.55 Finally, the Rule allows the 
Agencies to permit other activity by rule, if such activity “would pro-
mote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and 
the financial stability of the United States.”56 The Rule’s exemptions 
are further circumscribed by statutory limitations that address safety 
and soundness and conflicts of interest.57 
                                                                                                                      
trading and other restricted activity conducted outside of the United States by foreign 
qualified banking organizations and certain other predominantly foreign banking organi-
zations under sections 4(c)(9) and (13) of the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”). 12 
U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H)–(I). 
48 12 U.S.C. § 1851(g)(2). 
49 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(B). 
50 12 U.S.C. § 1851(g)(3) (Supp. IV 2010). The exemption for market-making-related 
activities is the focus of Sections B and C below. See infra notes 62–140 and accompanying 
text. 
51 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(F). 
52 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G), (f). 
53 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(C), (E), ( J). 
54 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(C). 
55 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(E). 
56 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)( J) (Supp. IV 2010). 
57 Id. § 1851(d)(2). The Rule not only prohibits, but also requires, the Agencies to lim-
it or restrict by rule any transaction, class of transactions, or activity that would “involve or 
result in a material conflict of interest . . . between the banking entity and its clients, cus-
tomers, or counterparties” that would “result, directly or indirectly, in a material exposure 
by the banking entity to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies” or “pose a threat to 
the safety and soundness of such banking entity” or “pose a threat to the financial stability 
of the United States.” Id. 
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 The Rule also requires the Agencies to implement a systematic in-
spection and examination program, as discussed in Section C below.58 
As part of such a program, compliance personnel at banking organiza-
tions must identify objective metrics that trigger subjective review of cer-
tain activities under an organization’s internal controls, policies, and 
procedures.59 Given the ease with which individual transactions can be 
reclassified,60 it will be difficult for the Agencies and for firms them-
selves to police a prohibition whose distinctions turn on qualitative 
considerations. The allocation of enforcement responsibilities to mul-
tiple Agencies—including the Commissions, which have limited re-
sources and experience with the kind of iterative supervision bank reg-
ulators employ—further complicates coordinated action.61 
B. Regulation of Market Makers in Financial Markets 
 Perhaps the most hotly contested exemption from the Rule’s re-
strictions on proprietary trading is the exemption for market-making-
related activities.62 Because the text of the Rule itself provides little 
guidance as to the contours of this exemption, the Agencies have 
sought to articulate a vision of how market-making-related activities 
may be distinguished from other types of dealing.63 Subsection 1 dis-
cusses how the concept of market making as a regulatory classification 
is most developed in the context of organized markets, such as ex-
                                                                                                                      
58 Id. § 1851(e)(1); see infra notes 103–140 and accompanying text. 
59 For example, under the Rule, the purpose or intent of the actor is relevant to de-
termining whether a transaction is prohibited or exempted from the prohibition. As an 
example, the intent to profit from short-term price movements is prohibited, whereas the 
intent to mitigate risk or meet the near-term liquidity needs of customers is exempt. See 12 
U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B)–(C), (d)(2)(A). 
60 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Finan-
cial Product Development, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1553, 1640–55 (2008) (describing how the 
securities industry successfully argued that the characterization of a repurchase agreement 
as a form of secured financing should depend “upon the intent of the parties,” rather than 
economic equivalence); Merkley & Levin, supra note 10, at 544 (relating the comments of 
one banker, who remarked that he could “find a way to say that virtually any trade we make 
is somehow related to serving our clients”). 
61 See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA-TCH Letter, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the inherent diffi-
culty in organizing enforcement responsibilities among the Agencies); Letter from Paul A. 
Volcker to the Agencies 4–5 (Feb. 13, 2012) (No. OCC-2011–0014–0209) (discussing the 
challenge of enforcing the Rule’s restrictions). 
62 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 33, at 1074 (discussing the loopholes allowed for com-
mercial banks under the Rule); Wilmarth, supra note 33, at 1028 (noting the problematic 
nature of the distinction between proprietary trading and market making). 
63 Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 app. B (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011) (providing 
commentary regarding identification of permitted market-making-related activities). 
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changes, which rely on such specialized dealers to provide market par-
ticipants with a reasonable expectation of liquidity.64 Many products— 
such as government and corporate debt, and individually tailored notes 
and derivatives—have not traditionally traded on such markets, but ra-
ther in bilateral “over-the-counter” transactions.65 Subsection 2 conse-
quently discusses how market making outside the context of organized 
markets represents a quality of service—providing liquidity and expo-
sure on demand—that is difficult to define or enforce by rule.66 
1. Organized Securities Markets 
 On organized markets, the term “market maker” generally refers 
to dealers who hold themselves out as willing to purchase and sell fi-
nancial instruments on a regular or continuous basis, whether to mar-
ket professionals or to the public generally.67 Such intermediaries typi-
cally trade in one or more assigned or allocated instruments (or classes 
of financial instrucments) and receive an exclusive franchise,68 quoting 
privileges,69 compensation,70 or other regulatory privileges.71 In return, 
                                                                                                                      
 
64 See infra notes 67–88 and accompanying text. 
65 For purposes of this Article, I use the term “over-the-counter” to refer to transac-
tions that are not effected on a securities or futures exchange. Many over-the-counter 
transactions take place through electronic trading systems or other trading facilities, such 
as “swap execution facilities.” See infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. Such facilities 
do not necessarily provide the same degree of centralization and are not subject to the 
same degree of regulatory oversight as exchanges. 
66 See infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(38) (West 2012) (defining “market maker” under the 
Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-8 (2012) (defining qualified over-the-counter and third 
market makers) for purposes of the FRB’s Regulation U, which governs margin require-
ments); see also Exchange Act Release No. 47,364, 68 Fed. Reg. 8686, 8688–90 (Feb. 24, 
2003) (suggesting, in the context of distinguishing “traders” from “dealers,” that dealers 
generally provide liquidity services in transactions with investors, whereas market makers 
generally provide such services in transactions with other professionals); Morris Mendel-
son & Junius W. Peake, Intermediaries’ or Investors’: Whose Market Is It Anyway?, 19 J. Corp. L. 
443, 470–71 (1994) (proposing a definition of market maker that includes “any person or 
firm which, in the regular course of its business, buys and sells securities from the public, 
attempting to make a profit from the differences between the purchase and sales prices,” 
regardless of whether it is required to register as a broker-dealer or to stand ready to make 
markets in selected or assigned securities during market hours). 
68 See, e.g., NYSE Rule 103B, NYSE (Sept. 7, 2012), http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSE/ 
Rules/. 
69 See, e.g., NASDAQ Rule 4613, NASDAQ ( Jan. 14, 2013), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet. 
com (“For each security in which a member is registered as a Nasdaq Market Maker, the 
member shall be willing to buy and sell such security for its own account on a continuous 
basis and shall enter and maintain a two-sided quotation . . . .”). 
70 Such compensation, depending on the jurisdiction in which the market is located, 
could consist of fees paid by the issuer of the financial instrument. See, e.g., Stanislav Dol-
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such intermediaries generally commit to provide liquidity to the ex-
change’s participants as needed in order to maintain a fair and orderly 
market (the so-called “affirmative obligation”), and in some markets, 
agree not to trade for their own account when not necessary for that 
purpose (the so-called “negative obligation”).72 Importantly, such regu-
latory privileges exist not only because regulators consider market mak-
ing activity to be less risky than proprietary trading,73 but also because 
concerns about financial responsibility and conflicts of interest must 
yield to the objective of facilitating continuous trading.74 
 Regulators and the markets they regulate have long struggled to 
balance the market maker’s need to make a reasonable return in the 
face of adverse selection against the need to ensure that any benefits 
                                                                                                                      
gopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation: Incentives for Mar-
ket Makers? 42–54 (Feb. 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2169601. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 5250 prohibits 
U.S. broker-dealers from receiving any payment or other consideration from an issuer for 
market making, but the SEC has approved rebate programs implemented by various securi-
ties exchanges. See Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether to Approve or Dis-
approve Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Market Maker Incentive Programs for Certain 
Exchange-Traded Products, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,052, 42,053 ( July 17, 2012); FINRA Rule 5250, 
FINRA (Dec. 15, 2010), http://finra.compinet.com. 
71 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (excluding 
from federal margin requirements any credit extended, maintained, or arranged to or for a 
registered broker-dealer “to finance its activities as a market maker or an underwriter”); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.11a1-5 (deeming transactions effected by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) market makers to be consistent with Section 11(a)(1) of 
the Exchange Act); id. § 240.15c3-1(a)(6)(iii)(A) (establishing a lower net capital require-
ment for certain broker-dealers acting as a market maker or specialist); id. §§ 242.201(d)(2), 
.203(b)(2)(iii) (exempting short sales by market makers from the restrictions imposed by 
Regulation SHO, which regulates practices with respect to short sales). 
72 George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and Implications for 
the Future, 61 Bus. Law. 217, 224–25 (2005). The affirmative obligation to trade arises 
when there is a comparative lack of liquidity (thus requiring the market maker to take an 
unwanted inventory position), and the negative obligation arises when there is adequate 
liquidity provided by other market participants (notwithstanding the desirability of selling 
unwanted positions or profiting from transactions at the bid/ask spread). Id. 
73 See, e.g., Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,961 (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011) 
(asserting that a market maker “typically generates significant revenue relative to the risks 
that it retains” and accordingly “will typically demonstrate consistent profitability and low 
earnings volatility under normal market conditions”). Market making, of course, is never-
theless not a risk-free activity. See, e.g., Larry Harris, Trading and Exchanges: Market 
Microstructure for Practitioners 401 (2003) (describing generally the risks and 
strategies of market makers); Maureen O’Hara, Market Microstructure Theory 20–
29 (1997) (describing generally the relationship between a market maker’s or dealer’s risk 
of failure and the spread it quotes). 
74 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 103-76 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1666, 1678 (reprinting 
an SEC comment that the market-making exception in Section 11(a)(1) of the Exchange Act 
was included because market making was considered “beneficial to the markets”). 
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provided to market makers are tied to their commitment to provide 
liquidity.75 At the most conceptual level, market makers have an incen-
tive to avoid trading with “informed traders” and to seek out trading 
with “uninformed traders.” Market makers who sell to, or buy from, 
counterparties with superior knowledge of the financial instrument 
traded may routinely find themselves holding money-losing positions in 
inventory.76 Accordingly, they have an incentive to avoid informed 
traders, increase spreads, pay for less informed order flow, and pursue 
other strategies that compensate for this risk.77 
 To combat these tendencies, organized markets historically im-
posed both affirmative and negative obligations on market makers, 
backed by calibrated market privileges, to maintain a “fair and orderly 
market.”78 Exchanges and organized markets use a variety of tools to 
reward and punish market makers based on the value of the liquidity 
they provide to the exchange’s other constituencies. For example, ex-
changes may employ statistical measures to assess the performance of 
their registered specialists and market makers79 and reallocate financial 
                                                                                                                      
75 See infra notes 183–206 and accompanying text. 
76 Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making: Liquidity 
of Securities Markets in the Zero-Sum Game, 3 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 1, 12–21 (2012). In his 
analysis of various empirical studies regarding this issue, Stanislav Dolgopolov suggests that 
market makers are more sensitive to losses resulting from short-term informational advan-
tages of public traders (e.g., due to technological or logistical “advantages in acquiring, 
processing, and aggregating public information”), rather than access to nonpublic infor-
mation by insiders. Id. As a result, sensitivity to adverse selection is not necessarily limited 
to equity securities and related financial instruments, but to any class of financial product 
if there are asymmetries with respect to access to information about or trends concerning 
the underlying instrument (e.g., interest rates, commodity prices, securities indices). See id. 
77 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 73, at 502–09, 519–20. 
78 See, e.g., Former NYSE Rule 140 and Supplemental Material .10, NYSE (2002), http://finra. 
complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id-7476 (imposing affirm- 
ative and negative obligations on specialists in connection with “the maintenance, in so far as 
reasonably practicable, of a fair and orderly market on the Exchange in the stocks in which 
he is so acting”); see also Exchange Act Release No. 58,845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379, 64,380 (Oct. 
24, 2008) (noting that specialists were historically governed by positive and negative obliga-
tions). Although this negative obligation has been rescinded, market makers remain subject 
to affirmative obligations. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 104, NYSE (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSE/Rules/; Nasdaq Rule 4613, NASDAQ ( Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com (imposing quotation requirements and other obligations 
on Nasdaq-registered market makers “to assist in the maintenance, insofar as reasonably 
practicable, of fair and orderly markets”); 23A Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, 
Securities Law: Broker-Dealer Operations Under Securities and Commodities Law 
§ 9.8 (2011) (describing the affirmative obligations of Nasdaq market makers and NYSE spe-
cialists). 
79 See, e.g., CBOE Rule 8.60, CBOE ( June 18, 2010), http://cchwallstreet.com/CBOE/ 
Rules/; NYSE Rule 104, NYSE (Feb. 7, 2013), http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSE/Rules/. 
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instruments or fine tune privileges among registered entities.80 Some 
exchanges, moreover, are experimenting with compensation structures 
that seek to improve the quality of execution.81 
 Regulators also consider the threat of market dominance by a 
dealer or collusion among dealers in illiquid or highly tailored financial 
instruments. Collusion allows dealers to set unfavorably wide spreads or 
seek other forms of excessive compensation.82 Although hard caps on 
the amount of markups or markdowns on securities are difficult to en-
force, especially given the variety of markets in which equity products 
trade,83 the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) requires 
dominant market makers to establish a reasonable relationship be-
tween the price they charge customers and their contemporaneous cost 
of purchasing or selling a security.84 In addition, collusion among ex-
changes and market makers in organized markets has been the subject 
of various Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC investigations.85 
 To the extent that the governance of exchanges and organized 
markets has historically been dominated by their specialist or market 
making constituencies,86 the enforcement of such obligations has not 
                                                                                                                      
 
80 See, e.g., CBOE Rule 8.60(c), CBOE ( June 18, 2010), http://cchwallstreet.com/CBOE/ 
Rules/; NYSE Rule 103B, NYSE (Sept. 7, 2012), http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSE/Rules/. 
81 See, e.g., Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether to Approve or Disap-
prove Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Market Maker Incentive Programs for Certain 
Exchange-Traded Products, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,052, 42,053 ( July 17, 2012). 
82 See, e.g., FINRA Manual, NASD IM-2440-1 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet. 
com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3661; NASD, Notice to Mem 
bers 92–16: Policies and Procedures for Markups/Markdowns in Equity Securities 2–3 
(1992), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403& 
element_id=1709. 
83 See, e.g., FINRA Manual, NASD IM-2440-1, supra note 82 (stating that “[n]o defini-
tive answer can be given and no interpretation can be all-inclusive” with respect to the 
fairness of markups or spreads “for the obvious reason that what might be considered fair 
in one transaction could be unfair in another transaction because of different circum-
stances”). 
84 NASD, supra note 82, at 2–3. 
85 See, e.g., In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 141–42 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (discussing DOJ and SEC investigations);  In re Certain Activities of Options 
Exchs., Exchange Act Release No. 43,268, 2000 WL 1277616, at *2 (Sept. 11, 2000) (find-
ing that options exchanges impaired the options market by not promoting competition); 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market 15–16 (1996) 
(discussing the pressure to follow the pricing conventions in the NASDAQ market). 
86 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU 
L. Rev. 325, 347–38 (2001) (asserting that “[t]o the extent market power was not curtailed 
by competition or regulation, mutual governance [of exchanges] gave specialist or market 
maker members of an exchange control of the price, quality, and range of services pro-
duced by the exchange”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of 
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always been consistent. Tectonic changes in the role of exchange spe-
cialists or market makers usually occur only in the wake of major scan-
dals.87 The history of specialist and market maker regulation in the 
U.S. equity markets thus provides an interesting parallel with the Vol-
cker Rule.88 Because of the special advantages traditionally conferred 
on exchange specialists (e.g., exclusive access to the exchange’s order 
book with respect to their assigned securities), other constituencies that 
have a strong interest in the reputational integrity of the exchange, 
such as exchange brokers and customers, may often support efforts at 
constraining the specialists’ role. 
2. Over-the-Counter Markets 
 The concept of market making, as a regulatory classification, is not 
well established for financial instruments that trade off-exchange.89 In 
their discussion of the characteristics that distinguish market making 
from proprietary trading, the Agencies describe market making as “an 
intermediation service,” in which the market maker “assum[es] the role 
of a counterparty that stands ready to buy or sell a position that the cus-
tomer wishes to sell or buy.”90 The Proposing Release characterizes such 
activity as “passively providing liquidity by submitting resting orders that 
interact with the orders of others,” whether by automated execution or 
by the rules of the organized market.91 The absence of organized trad-
ing for most over-the-counter debt and derivative instruments, however, 
                                                                                                                      
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1757, 1800–01 (2002) (citing Roberta Karmel’s view of the demutualization of 
exchanges). 
87 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 282–89 (3d ed. 2003) 
(discussing the “breakdown” of self-regulation on the AMEX during the 1950s); Simon & 
Trkla, supra note 72, at 236–38 (summarizing concerns with respect to specialists detailed in 
Senate Report No. 73-1455 and the Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation’s Report to 
the Secretary of Commerce in the wake of the scandals and abuses of the 1920s). 
88 Simon & Trkla, supra note 72, at 236–38; see 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d) (Supp. IV 2010). 
89 Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,616 n.256 (May 23, 2012) 
(noting that the Exchange Act definition “would not be apposite in the context of non-
standardized securities or securities that are not regularly or continuously transacted”); see 
also Whitehead, supra note 5, at 50–51 (describing the role of market makers generally and 
the conceptual difficulty of distinguishing market making from speculative trading). 
90 Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 app. B, at 68,960 (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011). 
The focus on customers is compelled by the text of the Rule itself, but the regulators ac-
knowledge that customers of a market maker are likely to be “market professionals,” in 
contrast to “end users,” and that a market professional generally “makes use” of a market 
maker’s services either by “requesting such services or entering into a continuing relation-
ship . . . with respect to such services.” Id. 
91 Id. at 68,960. 
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renders that definition unworkable as a tool for distinguishing market 
making as a subcategory of dealing. 
 Some commentators view the role of market makers in over-the-
counter markets as including not only the provision of “liquidity and 
exposure,” but also an element of reputational integrity consistent with 
the service mission of the financial services industry.92 One scholar 
suggests that clients may expect firms holding themselves out as market 
makers to offer certain tacit promises, such as assurances that tailored 
or exotic products are not designed to benefit insiders or other parties 
at the client’s expense, and that the price and terms of instruments of-
fered for sale efficiently serve the client’s needs.93 Many market mak-
ers, however, view themselves solely as counterparties, and not invest-
ment advisers with a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
client when engaged in market making.94 These differences in the per-
ception of the role of a market maker make it difficult to give norma-
tive content to the term “customer.”95 
                                                                                                                     
 The focus of the Agencies’ analysis therefore largely rests upon a 
descriptive analysis of the business model of market makers, without 
considering the market structure obligations that typically distinguish 
market making from dealing. For example, the Agencies assert that 
successful market makers typically “demonstrate consistent profitability 
and low earnings volatility” by limiting the extent to which they are ex-
posed to market movements and by initiating transactions with non-
customers only to the extent that they facilitate customer transactions.96 
Although this may be an accurate description of the strategy that mar-
ket makers employ in practice, it does not reflect the value of the ser-
 
92 Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets 
After the Financial Meltdown, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 323, 344 (2011); see Steven M. Davidoff et 
al., The SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary Duties in Investment Banking, 37 
J. Corp. L. 529, 541 (2012) (discussing the historical importance of trust and reputation in 
the investment banking industry). 
93 Thompson, supra note 92, at 344–47 (discussing how newer synthetic products have 
made clients more reliant on market makers). 
94 See, e.g., Wall Street and the Financial Crisis—The Role of Investment Banks: Hearing Before 
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental 
Investigations, 111th Cong. 26–27 (2010) (recording the opinion of one Goldman Sachs 
executive that the duty of market makers is only to provide the bid-ask spread and fair 
market prices). 
95 The Agencies attempt to address this “client-oriented” service aspect of the Rule by 
identifying certain “customer facing” metrics. See infra note 124. Moreover, the statutory 
limitation on transactions that “involve or result in a material conflict of interest” would 
seem to address more egregious transactions that seek to extract profits at a counterparty’s 
expense. See supra note 57. 
96 Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,961 (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011). 
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vice provided by market makers to other market participants. As at least 
one commentator argues, there is a risk that market makers will adapt 
to the environment promoted by this analysis by trading only under 
circumstances when additional liquidity is unnecessary, and withdraw-
ing from the market when additional liquidity might be helpful.97 
 More controversial are the regulators’ assertions about the role of 
market makers outside of an organized market. To say that the purpose 
of market making is “not to earn profits as a result of [price] move-
ments” is a question of market design, not a question of the market 
maker’s business model.98 As the Proposing Release recognizes, al-
though market makers (like all dealers) derive profits from the differ-
ence between the price at which they purchase and the price at which 
they are willing to sell a financial instrument, they may also profit (or 
sustain losses) from changes in their aggregate long or short position in 
the financial instrument.99 Distinguishing profit-taking from each of 
these sources, for the purpose of distinguishing market makers from 
non-market-maker dealers, is a matter of degree; the more illiquid the 
instrument, the more attuned a dealer will be to price movements with 
respect to its net long or short position. 
 Ironically, past efforts to regulate the conduct of such dealers have 
focused on limiting the ability of dealers to profit from spreads under 
the guise of business conduct or antifraud rules100—thus pushing them 
to assume greater inventory risk as well as adopt more efficient inven-
tory management systems. For example, dealers in corporate debt se-
curities or derivatives may hold themselves out as being willing to buy 
and sell particular financial instruments or classes of instruments, with 
no expectation of being able to liquidate the position within a reason-
                                                                                                                      
97 Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed Volcker Rule 19 (Rock Ctr. for Corpo-
rate Governance, Working Paper No. 106, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990472. 
98 Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,960 (stating that the purpose of market mak-
ing is not to earn profits from price movements). 
99 Id. at 68,960 (recognizing that market makers will make at least some profit from price 
movements). Notwithstanding comments to the contrary, the Commissions have imple-
mented Dodd-Frank’s definitions of “swap dealer” and “security-based swap dealer” with the 
understanding that all market makers are dealers, but that not all dealers are market makers. 
17 C.F.R. §§ 1.3(ggg)(ii), 240.3a71-1 (2012) (defining the terms “swap dealer” and “security-
based swap dealer” to include any person who “[m]akes a market” in swaps and security-
based swaps); see Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,599–601 (May 23, 
2012) (summarizing comments suggesting a narrow definition of swap dealer). 
100 Allen Ferrell, The Law and Finance of Broker-Dealer Mark-Ups 6–10 (The Harvard John 
M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805131 (discussing 
both FINRA’s attempts to regulate spreads as well as the SEC’s use of anti-fraud provisions 
for excessive mark-ups and mark-downs). 
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able time period.101 Assuming that dealers must make a certain profit 
on such transactions in order to compensate for the risk of holding the 
position in inventory, their only recourse is to widen spreads. The Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) nevertheless adopted 
guidelines that limit the spreads that dealers may charge in such trans-
actions.102 
C. Proposed Implementation of the Market-Making-Related Activities Exemption 
 Consistent with the view of over-the-counter market making de-
scribed above, the Agencies approach the implementation of the ex-
emption for “market-making-related activities” solely from the perspec-
tive of containing risk and limiting interaction with noncustomers. 
First, the Agencies’ proposed rules define the scope of each of the ex-
emptions with a particular emphasis on establishing rebuttable pre-
sumptions with respect to certain categories of transactions.103 Second, 
the Agencies propose quantitative metrics to be used by firms and their 
examiners to determine whether impermissible trading activity has oc-
curred or is occurring.104 Finally, the Agencies require firms to imple-
ment internal controls and written policies and procedures, with high-
level managerial accountability, both for the purpose of self-policing 
and facilitating ex post analysis.105 
1. Definition of Market-Making-Related Activities 
 The Volcker Rule’s exemption for “underwriting and market-
making-related activities” in financial instruments, by its terms, is lim-
ited to activities “designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Seha M. Tinic, The Economics of Liquidity Services, 86 Q.J. Econ. 79, 81 (1972) 
(indicating that dealer specialists must hold larger positions for longer time periods to 
provide adequate liquidity to the market when dealing in inactive stock issues). 
102 FINRA Manual, NASD IM-2440-2 (2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/ 
en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3662. FINRA generally requires 
dealers in debt securities to calculate, and thus assess the fairness or excessiveness of, a 
mark-up or mark-down based on the prevailing market price of the security. IM 2440–2 
presumes that the prevailing market price is the dealer’s contemporaneous cost (or the 
dealer’s contemporaneous proceeds), but permits dealers to consider contemporaneous 
transactions or quotations, prices of similar securities, or a price derived from economic 
models when the presumption is overcome (e.g., due to intervening changes in interest 
rates, credit quality, or other information). Id. 
103 See infra notes 106–119 and accompanying text. 
104 See infra notes 120–128 and accompanying text. 
105 See infra notes 129–140 and accompanying text. 
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term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.”106 As discussed 
above, the Rule covers the purchase and sale of (or acquisition or dis-
position of positions in) securities, futures, options, derivatives, or other 
financial instruments determined by the Agencies.107 To implement 
the definition of market-making-related activities, the Agencies have 
devised various qualitative criteria relating to the intent of the entity (or 
its trading desk), compliance with which would be monitored by the 
quantitative metrics and compliance program discussed in the follow-
ing sections.108 
 In the proposed rules, the Agencies limit eligibility for the exemp-
tion to those banking affiliates that are regulated as dealers with respect 
to the appropriate instrument.109 The affiliate, or the relevant trading 
desk of the affiliate, must also “hold[] itself out as being willing to buy 
and sell . . . the covered financial position for its own account on a reg-
ular or continuous basis.”110 Furthermore, its activities, as required by 
the statute, must not “exceed the reasonably expected near term de-
mands of clients, customers or counterparties.”111 More controversially, 
the Agencies propose that such activities must be “designed to generate 
revenues primarily from fees, commissions, bid/ask spreads or other 
income not attributable” to appreciation in the value of covered posi-
tions or the hedging of such positions.112 The compensation of persons 
performing the market-making-related activities must also be designed 
“not to reward proprietary risk-taking.”113 
 Despite the repeated statutory references to the design of a trading 
desk’s activities, industry commenters criticize the proposed definitions 
for hard coding criteria or presumptions for distinguishing permissible 
and impermissible activities, particularly given that the Agencies have 
not tailored these definitions to reflect the variety of markets in which 
financial instruments trade.114 To characterize a transaction in a particu-
lar financial instrument as being motivated by the desire to reap a short-
                                                                                                                      
106 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2010). 
107 Id. § 1851(h)(4); see supra notes 62–102 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,956–57 (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011). 
109 See id. at 68,947, Proposed Rule § _.4(a)(2)(iv). The rules require, for example, that 
a bank affiliate (other than an entity engaged in business outside of the United States) 
relying on the exemption be registered as a dealer, a swap or security-based swap dealer, a 
government securities dealer, or a municipal securities dealer, depending on the instru-
ments in which the entity deals. See id. 
110 Id. § _.4(b)(2)(ii). 
111 Id. § _.4(b)(2)(iii). 
112 Id. § _.4(b)(2)(v). 
113 Id. at 68,948, Proposed Rule § _.4(b)(2)(vii). 
114 See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA-TCH Letter, supra note 11, at A-24 to -25. 
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term profit, as opposed to meeting the demands of a customer, client, 
or counterparty, might be deemed to depend on factors such as the 
availability of the instrument, the frequency with which it trades, the size 
of the entity’s transactions, and price volatility.115 
 The most contested element of the proposed definition, however, 
is the revenue tracing requirement. Although the Rule specifically tar-
gets profit-taking from short-term price movements,116 dealers will 
claim that, for many illiquid securities, it is impossible to distinguish 
profits from spreads, markups, and commissions, and profits from 
short-term price movements.117 Finding a party willing to take the op-
posite side of a trade might take a significant period of time, during 
which the dealer is subject to the risk of both favorable and adverse 
price movements.118 Although the Agencies propose requiring firms to 
develop metrics for distinguishing revenues from spreads and revenues 
from price movements,119 the utility of such daily measurements turns 
on the availability of enough contemporaneous (or reliable historical) 
data about market prices to draw meaningful distinctions—the less pre-
trade and post-trade transparency a market exhibits, the less meaning-
ful such measurements will be. 
2. Measures of Market Making Activity 
 In addition to the design element, the Agencies propose certain 
quantitative recordkeeping and monthly reporting requirements on 
banking entities and their subsidiaries and affiliates that (on a consoli-
dated basis) have trading assets and liabilities the gross sum of which is 
greater than or equal to $1 billion, with heightened requirements if the 
gross sum is greater than or equal to $5 billion.120 The statistics re-
quired of entities engaged in market-making-related activities are the 
                                                                                                                      
115 Id. 
116 See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B), (h)(4) (Supp. IV 2010). 
117 See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA-TCH Letter, supra note 11, at A-30 to -34, A-129 to -130 (asserting 
that the distinction between fee income, spreads, and price appreciation “falls apart in less 
liquid markets where, among other things, market makers often need to hold inventory”). 
118 Duffie, supra note 97, at 19 (“Were the proposed rule to be implemented, market 
makers who absorb large demand and supply shocks into their inventories would experience 
a ‘deterioration’ in the proposed metrics for their market-making risk, and the associated 
threat of regulatory sanction. They would also be less inclined to absorb the associated risks 
given the likely sanctions for significant profits from price changes. Further, under the pro-
posed rules for trader compensation, market making traders would have significantly lower 
incentives to accept trades involving significant increases in risk or profit.”). 
119 See infra notes 120–128 and accompanying text. 
120 Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,956–57 (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011). 
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most detailed, and include various measures of risk management,121 
revenue sources,122 revenue relative to risk,123 and customer-facing ac-
tivity.124 The relevant entity or trading desk is required to compute such 
statistics and its compliance personnel are required to use the data to 
monitor compliance with the exemption pursuant to the firm’s internal 
controls and written policies and procedures.125 
 Although the banking industry appears more receptive to the use 
of quantitative measurements, at least one commentator has expressed 
concern that the proposed metrics under the Volcker Rule (1) do noth-
ing to encourage a duty similar to the affirmative obligation of market 
makers to supply liquidity when it is needed, and (2) further undermine 
the idea of a negative obligation to refrain from trading in instruments 
for which liquidity is not needed.126 For example, the use of metrics that 
measure revenue versus risk will discourage firms from facilitating cus-
tomer transactions that expose the firm to significant proprietary risk; 
instead, such firms may prefer “cream skimming” transactions that reap 
                                                                                                                      
121 All banking entities and trading desks subject to Appendix A that engage in market-
making-related activities are required to calculate “value at risk” (VaR) on a daily basis. Id. 
at 68,957. Those with over $5 billion in gross trading assets and liabilities must also calcu-
late Stress VaR, VaR Exceedance, certain Risk Factor Sensitivities, and Risk and Position 
Limits (whether expressed as VaR or Risk Factor Sensitivities, or otherwise, such as net 
position limits) on a daily basis. Id. at 68,957–58. 
122 All banking entities and trading desks subject to Appendix A that engage in market-
making-related activities are required to calculate daily by trading unit Comprehensive 
Profit and Loss (“P/L”) (and Attribution of Comprehensive P/L to separate sources of risk 
and revenue), as well as to calculate separately daily profits and losses from changes in 
market value of their underlying holdings (Portfolio P/L); from the spread charged be-
tween purchases and sales, whether by reference to prevailing market prices or appropri-
ate proxies (Spread P/L); and Fee Income and Expense. Id. at 68,958–59. In this connec-
tion, entities or desks must also report daily the ratio of Spread P/L and Fee Income 
received to the amount paid out by the unit. Id. at 68,960. 
123 All banking entities and trading desks subject to Appendix A that engage in market-
making-related activities are required to calculate the volatility of Comprehensive P/L and 
the volatility of Portfolio P/L, as well as the respective ratios of P/L to volatility, on a 30-
day, 60-day, and 90-day basis. Id. at 68,959. In addition, those with over $5 billion in gross 
trading assets and liabilities must also calculate Skewness and Kurtosis of P/L (with a view 
to monitoring the symmetry and prevalence of extreme deviations of profits and losses) as 
well as the number of unprofitable days (based on Comprehensive and Portfolio P/L) with 
the same frequency. Id. at 68,959. 
124 All banking entities and trading desks subject to Appendix A that engage in market-
making-related activities are required to calculate on a 30-day, 60-day, and 90-day basis the 
amount of risk associated with its inventory (as measured by each of its Risk Factor Sensi-
tivities) that is turned over, the amount of time its trading assets and liabilities have been 
held, and the ratio of trades effected with customers and noncustomers (as identified by 
the firm’s compliance program). Id. at 68,959–60. 
125 Id. at 68,957. 
126 Duffie, supra note 97, at 4. 
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easy profits with little risk.127 Likewise, metrics that focus on trading ac-
tivity with clients, as opposed to other financial services firms, may inap-
propriately discount the value of the liquidity that wholesale dealers 
provide to facilitate client-oriented transactions by smaller dealers.128 
 One can of course debate whether such forms of trading are or 
should be beyond the scope of the market making exemption, but to 
the extent that there exist socially valuable types of proprietary trading 
that present significant risks, there will be relentless pressure on the 
Agencies to view these statistics charitably. The utility of metrics that 
attempt to distinguish portfolio profits and losses from spread profits 
and losses and other sources of fee income is particularly problematic 
for all but the most liquid markets. To the extent that firms presumably 
have an incentive to maximize recorded and reported Spread Profit 
and Loss (“P/L”) and minimize Portfolio P/L, firms may stiffen resis-
tance to the implementation of market structures that will encourage 
greater fungibility and provide greater pre-trade transparency (and 
thus less opportunity to manufacture their own estimates of prevailing 
spreads for purposes of these computations). 
3. Compliance Program Requirement 
 The final piece of the Volcker Rule exemption is the requirement 
to establish an internal compliance program to ensure compliance with 
the exemption as appropriate for the particular entity.129 Among other 
elements, the compliance program must consist of (1) “written policies 
and procedures” regarding activities covered by the Rule, (2) “internal 
controls” reasonably designed to monitor and identify potential areas 
of noncompliance, (3) a “management framework” that presumably 
escalates potentially noncompliant activity as necessary for review and 
appropriate remedial action, (4) “independent testing” of the compli-
ance program for effectiveness, (5) training, and (6) sufficient record-
keeping to demonstrate compliance.130 
                                                                                                                      
127 Id. (observing that a bank’s market making affiliate could cream-skim the market 
by limiting their activities to highly liquid securities that pose little market risk). 
128 Id. (arguing that proposed criteria and metrics would “discourage the use of mar-
ket making discretion” and “meeting a client’s demand for immediacy would be unattrac-
tively risky relative to the expected profit”). 
129 Proposing Release, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,946, 68,955, Proposed Rule §§ _.4(b)(2)(i), 
_.20(a) (OCC et al. Nov. 7, 2011) (stating that compliance should be appropriate for the 
“size, scope and complexity of [its] activities and business structure”). 
130 Id. at 68,853. 
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 Firms whose trading assets and liabilities equal or exceed $1 billion 
(or ten percent or more of its assets) are required to comply with addi-
tional compliance standards.131 The internal policies and procedures 
must contain detailed identification of trading accounts, trading units, 
and organizational structure; a description of the mission and strategy 
for each trading unit (including authorized activities, revenue sources, 
and identification of customers); and a description of risks and risk 
management processes, as well as hedging policies and procedures.132 
The required internal controls, moreover, must not only ensure com-
pliance by each trading unit with authorized risks, instruments, prod-
ucts, and risk limits, but also develop and implement additional quanti-
tative measurements designed in accordance with the firm’s specific 
trading strategy.133 The policies and procedures must also explain how 
violations will be remedied.134 
 All federal financial regulators have significant experience devel-
oping inspection and examination programs to ensure that firms estab-
lish, maintain, and update proper controls, policies, and procedures in 
light of the scope of their activities, as required by the Rule.135 The abil-
ity to take appropriate supervisory action in the face of evidence that 
the Rule has been violated—whether in the form of quantitative met-
rics or otherwise—will be more problematic. The Rule provides, for 
example, that the primary recourse for the Agencies, upon “reasonable 
cause to believe” that an entity has violated the Rule’s restrictions, is to 
order termination of the activity, after due notice and the opportunity 
for a hearing.136 
 Some regulators are better equipped to implement this form of 
regulation than others.137 From the perspective of bank regulators, who 
are accustomed to continuous examination of their regulated entities’ 
business practices and have considerable discretion and resources to 
coerce compliance through the supervisory process, the implementa-
                                                                                                                      
131 Id. at 68,963 app. C. 
132 Id. at 68,964. 
133 Id. at 68,965. 
134 Id. 
135 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(1) (Supp. IV 2010). 
136 Id. § 1851(e)(2). 
137 Cf. Eric J. Pan, Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 743, 
756 (2010) (noting that the organization of a regulatory system must take into account 
“whether the arrangement of existing agencies suits their regulatory responsibilities” and 
“whether multiple agencies have adequate resources”). 
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tion of the Rule may seem relatively noncontroversial.138 The Commis-
sions, which traditionally rely on administrative and judicial enforce-
ment tools, will have to decide to what extent they intend to devote 
regulatory resources either to reviewing such reports or to taking ap-
propriate enforcement action against banking entities under their su-
pervision.139 This allocation of responsibility also raises important ques-
tions about the discretion of the Commissions to adopt rules that serve 
ancillary objectives.140 
II. The Volcker Rule and Its Expressive Potential 
 However effective the Rule may be in achieving its stated ends, the 
Rule’s prohibition nevertheless conveys an unmistakable discontent 
with the proprietary trading activities of banks.141 A more ambitious 
reading of the Rule could recognize the opportunity to build upon the 
experience gained from the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 to improve the quality of proprietary trading 
services provided by financial services providers. Even if Congress may 
not have explicitly contemplated such a role for the Volcker Rule,142 
the framers of the Rule clearly recognized the important public interest 
in preserving certain proprietary trading activities.143 Moreover, the 
structure of the Rule arguably authorizes the Agencies to influence the 
                                                                                                                      
138 See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation of Finan-
cial Regulation in the United States 22 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 09-19, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1300431 (contrasting the 
FRB’s “very large staff of highly-trained economists, who have studied the economics of 
bank mergers in exquisite detail,” with the SEC’s “handful of professionally trained econ-
omists”). 
139 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Regulating the Financial Markets by Examinations 26 (Bos. 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-08, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1339913 
(“Currently, a more significant portion of the SEC’s resources is devoted to enforcement 
by prosecution, including investigation of particular offenses. The Commission’s Office of 
Compliance is far smaller. As compared to the banking regulators, the SEC examination 
force is even smaller.”). 
140 See infra notes 322–346 and accompanying text. 
141 156 Cong. Rec. S5894 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley) 
(“While the intent of section 619 is to restore the purpose of the Glass-Steagall barrier be-
tween commercial and investment banks, we also update that barrier to reflect the modern 
financial world and permit a broad array of low-risk, client-oriented financial services.”). 
142 See infra notes 250–346 and accompanying text. 
143 156 Cong. Rec. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Christopher 
Dodd) (“The purpose of the Volcker rule is to eliminate excessive risk taking activities by 
banks and their affiliates while at the same time preserving safe, sound investment activi-
ties that serve the public interest.”). 
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nature of over-the-counter trading in the course of defining the scope 
of these statutory exemptions.144 
                                                                                                                     
 To this end, the Rule represents a unique opportunity for the 
Agencies to consider whether the Rule’s metrics and compliance pro-
cedures may be harnessed to influence norms for trading in over-the-
counter instruments. Theorists of the expressive function of legislation 
have grappled with the significance of laws that effectively make state-
ments without necessarily providing punitive damages or devoting sig-
nificant resources to enforcement.145 As discussed below, such expres-
sive laws can arguably help discover, establish, or change prevailing 
social norms in a manner that changes the behavior of members of a 
social sphere without the use of legal sanctions.146 
 Section A discusses the different theories of expressive laws,147 
whereas Section B analyzes how expressive laws might be employed in 
financial regulation.148 Finally, Section C asserts that an implementa-
tion of the Rule that helps to identify the trading preferences of differ-
ent segments of the trading community could bring significant syner-
gistic benefits to the structure of over-the-counter financial markets.149 
A. Theories of Expressive Law 
 Theorists of expressivism have sought to identify the mechanisms 
by which a statement of law, without more, can influence behavior.150 
Perhaps the most straightforward theory, the focal point theory, is that 
some legal statements may establish a focal point for standardizing be-
havior.151 The focal point theory may apply in a situation where there is 
no established norm and the law or regulation provides a focal point 
 
144 See infra notes 250–346 and accompanying text. 
145 See infra notes 150–170 and accompanying text. 
146 In borrowing the concept of expressivism, it is important to distinguish laws that 
seek to establish a “focal point for coordinating behavior” (as discussed in Part II.A below) 
from laws that have purely symbolic value without any expectation that they will necessarily 
change behavior. See infra notes 150–170 and accompanying text. As Cass Sunstein notes, 
the latter type of symbolic legislation—such as a prohibition against flag-burning—may 
actually encourage noncompliance by those who disagree with its meaning. See, e.g., Cass 
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 965 (1996) (suggesting 
that governmental efforts to curb teenage smoking might “backfire and make smoking 
seem bold or glamorous”). 
147 See infra notes 150–170 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra notes 171–182 and accompanying text. 
149 See infra notes 183–206 and accompanying text. 
150 See infra notes 151–170 and accompanying text. 
151 Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 
1666 (2000). 
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for the creation of a new norm.152 For example, in the absence of a 
rule that “all drivers must drive in the right lane,” or that “vehicles pro-
ceed through a four-way stop sign in counterclockwise order,” drivers 
may incur significant transaction costs in navigating traffic.153 By an-
nouncing a neutral standard that coordinates everyone’s expectations, 
the law solves the collective action problem in a manner that reduces 
everyone’s transaction costs.154 
                                                                                                                     
 More substantially, the focal point theory may also apply where a 
social norm already exists and the law attempts to alter the existing 
consensus, whether through the discovery of a new consensus norm or 
the imposition of an intensely held minority preference on an indiffer-
ent majority.155 Examples of such social norms include prohibitions 
against littering in the park or smoking in restaurants. In the absence 
of a legal statement, those opposed to littering or smoking must either 
expend significant resources in order to find and preserve lit-
ter/smoke-free environments, or suffer disutility from the offending 
conduct.156 The existence of a law, however, may have the effect of dis-
couraging noncompliance and empowering supporters to demand that 
others come into compliance, thus conforming behavior to the new 
norm without the use of legal sanctions.157 
 
152 Joy Sabino Mullane, The Unlearning Curve: Tax-Based Congressional Regulation of Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1045, 1074 (2011) (arguing that “[Richard McAd-
ams’] theory works in situations where coordination is needed and a norm has not yet 
been established”). 
153 See McAdams, supra note 151, at 1684 (discussing transaction costs). 
154 See id. at 1659. 
155 Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va. L. 
Rev. 1603, 1615 (2000). Minority preferences may become norms through the private 
efforts of “norm entrepreneurs” (or “busybodies,” as critics such as Robert Scott may call 
them) that expend significant individual effort to establish and enforce them. Cass R. Sun-
stein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2030–31 (1996); see Scott, 
supra, at 1615. 
156 See McAdams, supra note 151, at 1684 & n.84 (indicating, using smoking as an ex-
ample, that transaction costs will deter bargaining when conflict arises only once between 
strangers due to time restraints and due to an inability to efficiently pay either party for 
the right to restrain from or for the right to engage in smoking); see also Alex Geisinger, A 
Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 605, 640 (2004) 
(describing the belief among public choice scholars that transaction costs “limit the ability 
of individual citizens to pursue regulation that satisfies their preferences”). 
157 See McAdams, supra note 151, at 1685 (suggesting that a public smoking ban might 
empower nonsmokers to “cause a scene” to enforce their preference for smoke-free envi-
ronments); Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analy-
sis of the ADA, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1151, 1173 (2004) (book review) (noting a law’s ability to alter 
behavior by changing an individual’s preferences, by inducing fear of “social sanctions,” or 
by inducing pressure upon individuals through “societal sanctions”). 
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 Expressive laws that are intended to change social behavior within 
a community, however, will work only under certain conditions. First, 
members of the community must be sensitive to reputational utility, 
and in particular, the disutility that follows from violating a social norm 
established through consensus.158 For Richard McAdams, such reputa-
tional utility might take the form of a human desire to maintain or in-
crease one’s respect or esteem within a community relative to others by 
complying with social norms (whether by not littering in the park, or 
even calling out those who do), or conversely, to minimize shame re-
sulting from noncompliance.159 Other theorists suggest that social 
norms may be internalized based on second-order preferences (a de-
sire to obey the law or to follow the will of the majority) that trump 
first-order preferences (littering in the park).160 
 Second, the norm must be sufficiently publicized that members of 
the community cannot claim to be unaware of its existence.161 Here, 
the role of law is most salient in discovering and publicizing such con-
sensus. The law can serve, for example, as the “jolt necessary to create a 
new norm, or strengthen an old one,”162 both by virtue of the represen-
                                                                                                                      
158 See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585, 588 (1998) 
(describing the individual benefits, including enhanced reputation, that may result when a 
person upholds a social norm); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation 
of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 358 (1997) (describing three basic conditions for when an 
esteem-based norm may arise); Sunstein, supra note 155, at 2032 (arguing that “[b]ehavior 
and choice are a product not only of other people’s behavior, but also of the perceived judg-
ments of other people, and those judgments have a great deal to do with—indeed they consti-
tute—social norms,” and suggesting that “[r]eputational utility is . . . produced by social 
norms, and [that] it may shift over time because it is likely to be endogenous to both existing 
information and to law”). 
One must also consider the freedom of individuals to enter and exit the community. 
In the case of regulated financial services, a perception that U.S. regulation is unduly bur-
densome may result in the migration of trading operations offshore. See, e.g., Edward F. 
Greene & Ilona Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule and 
Margin Rules for Uncleared Swaps—A Call for Regulatory Coordination and Cooperation, 7 Cap. 
Market L.J. 271, 301–02 (2012). 
159 McAdams, supra note 158, at 364–65. 
160 See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 35, 41 
(2002) (discussing the law’s ability to “influence the probability of a behavior attracting 
second and third order sanctions,” for example, by altering “the meaning of riding a mo-
torcycle without a helmet from an exercise of ‘freedom’ to an act of high risk”); Stein, 
supra note 157, at 1187–88 (defining first, second, and third order sanctions in the context 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the “fear of social condemnation”). 
161 See Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1059, 
1087 (2003) (indicating that “[c]ommon knowledge of a law helps law coordinate expecta-
tions”); McAdams, supra note 151, at 1666 (arguing that a sufficiently publicized legal ex-
pression often provides a strong focal point). 
162 McAdams, supra note 158, at 403. 
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tative processes through which laws are formulated and the administra-
tive processes through which they are communicated to the public.163 
In addition, there must be some probability that compliance and non-
compliance with social norms can be detected or observed by members 
of the community.164 If the likelihood that other members of the com-
munity will detect a violation is low, the offending members’ expected 
reputational disutility may be insufficient to override the benefits of 
noncompliance.165 
 Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the new social norm 
must create a stable, welfare-enhancing equilibrium around which 
members of a community are able to coordinate their behavior.166 A 
well-grounded norm may grow stronger over time through the network 
effect of compliance. As more members of the community comply with 
a norm, norm enforcers will concentrate their persuasive activity on the 
increasingly smaller number of noncompliant members.167 By contrast, 
a norm that does not create such an equilibrium may never be firmly 
grounded.168 In some areas, such as the imposition of sanctions under 
criminal law, the idea of a stable equilibrium is often expressed in the 
language of moral credibility,169 whereas in others, it is largely a ques-
tion whether the utility reaped by norm enforcers creates sufficient lev-
erage to overpower resistance from norm violators who suffer corre-
sponding disutility.170 
                                                                                                                      
163 E.g., Geisinger, supra note 160, at 64–65; Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. 
McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informa-
tive Law 22–23 (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, No. 00-19, 2001), http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=260996. 
164 McAdams, supra note 158, at 355–61 (discussing three criteria, including “an inher-
ent risk that . . . behavior will be detected,” for “the pattern of disapproval” to create costs 
for the actor engaging in such behavior). 
165 Id. 
166 Cooter, supra note 158, at 593. 
167 Sunstein, supra note 146, at 909 (describing “norm bandwagons” and “norm cas-
cades”). 
168 See Cooter, supra note 158, at 586 (stating that the law’s expressive ability to alter 
the focal point of a particular behavior “can create or destroy a social norm without chang-
ing individual values”). 
169 See McAdams, supra note 158, at 398 (indicating that criminal punishments serve 
both as punishments and as expressions of society’s moral view and condemnation of the 
sanctioned behavior). 
170 Id. at 358 (indicating that a norm will arise if the cost or benefits afforded by socie-
tal esteem outweigh the cost or benefits of engaging in a particular activity). 
2013] Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, Financial Regulation, and Expressive Synergies 497 
B. Expressive Law and Financial Regulation 
 Several scholars have considered whether expressive readings of 
legislation or judicial decisions can successfully modify behavior in the 
realm of business or financial decision making. For example, one may 
argue that the principles-based regulation movement promoted by 
some scholars of financial regulation is a variant of expressivism. For 
such scholars, the role of the policymaker is to articulate “best prac-
tices” or “core principles,” which are developed and implemented pri-
marily through ongoing information-sharing and guidance between 
the industry and the regulators, rather than through traditional regula-
tory enforcement mechanisms.171 In a similar vein, several scholars ad-
vocate mandatory disclosures that may shame regulated entities into 
compliance with non-mandatory norms.172 Still others view the sermon-
izing opinions of the Delaware courts as playing an expressive role in 
developing fiduciary standards for directors of public companies.173 
 Generally, I doubt that financial legislation may play an expressive 
role in the same way that expressivist theorists have envisioned in other 
contexts. One question is whether it is possible to define a community 
                                                                                                                      
171 See, e.g., Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regu-
lation, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 38 (2008) (envisioning the role of a regulator in a principles-based 
and outcome-oriented regulation as “us[ing] its enhanced outcome-oriented analytical ca-
pacity to interrogate industry action, communicate results, provide ongoing guidance, and 
spur laggards with a view to effectuating its irreducibly public policy goals of safeguarding 
investors and promoting efficient capital markets,” even as it retains “[u]ltimate enforcement 
and coercive power”); James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 Duke 
L.J. 625, 671–72 (2007) (“Principles-based regulation requires the regulated to act as moral 
agents who assess whether their conduct conforms with the principles reflecting those values, 
not just whether their conduct violates a cost-effective rule.”). 
172 Examples include publication of names of tax-avoiding expatriates in the Federal 
Register or disclosures of omissions in a corporate code of ethics under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and 
Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 863, 918 
(2004) (discussing proposals to publish names of tax expatriates); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules requiring 
reporting companies “to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reason therefor, such 
issuer has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers”). 
173 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253, 
1276 (1999) (suggesting that the legal rules for the duty of loyalty are enforced “partly by 
regulation and partly by the support they give to social norms”); Edward B. Rock, Saints 
and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1016 (1997) 
(arguing that Delaware courts use “corporate law sermons” to “influence the development 
of the social norms of directors, officers, and lawyers”); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: 
An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 675, 688 (2002) (supporting the view “that corporate law shapes directors’ 
behavior primarily through its ‘sermonizing’ or ‘expressive’ function”). 
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that is capable of enforcing social norms through nonlegal rewards and 
sanctions.174 For example, despite the public hue and cry over excessive 
executive compensation, there is little evidence that the scorn of public 
shareholders (or nonshareholders, for that matter) affects the reputa-
tional utility of corporate executives.175 Executives, as other scholars 
have suggested, are if anything more likely to be sensitive to their social 
standing vis-à-vis their peers at public or private companies.176 As long 
as compensation reigns as the measure of esteem in this community, 
public finger-wagging may continue to be easily brushed off as envy of 
the “best and brightest.”177 
 Another question to ponder is whether policymakers or regulators 
can be taken seriously as norm entrepreneurs.178 For example, legisla-
tors and regulators who seek to regulate corporate governance or ex-
ecutive compensation, in the view of corporate executives, have little 
experience in the business world (other than as lawyers) and do not 
appreciate the complexity and pressure of corporate decision mak-
ing.179 Accordingly, their opinions as to the propriety of governance or 
compensation arrangements not only may appear to have no moral or 
common-sense basis, but also may be viewed as impeding the imple-
mentation of “useful devices and practices” and “discourag[ing] risk-
                                                                                                                      
174 See Geisinger, supra note 160, at 652 (arguing that the government has an extremely 
limited ability to act as a norm entrepreneur because, as an “outgroup source,” the gov-
ernment’s opining will generally be discounted by smaller normative groups). 
175 See Mullane, supra note 152, at 1077–78. 
176 Id. (arguing that recent executive compensation tax penalties failed to create nor-
mative attitudinal changes among highly paid executives as would be predicted by McAd-
ams’s theory); see also David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Execu-
tive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 451–55 (2010) (discussing previous failed attempts to rein in 
executive compensation through tax penalties and securities disclosure regulations). 
177 Karen Ho, Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street 257–71 (2009) (de-
scribing the culture of compensation on Wall Street). By contrast, the gentle scolding of 
the Delaware courts may have had more of an impact with public company directors, de-
spite the extremely rare instances of personal financial liability. See Claire Hill & Brett 
McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 
Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 333, 363 (2009) (suggesting that Delaware judges, “better than any oth-
er plausible actor in the relevant sphere,” act through their opinions to implement expres-
sive “reputational and norm-following mechanisms,” which influence the behavior of the 
“relatively small and close-knit community” of corporate officers and directors). 
178 See McAdams, supra note 151, at 1671–72 (discussing how regulators are actually 
implementing change and how this role encourages people seeking change to lobby regu-
lators and policymakers). 
179 See Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate 
Governance Law, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 345, 381–82 (2007). 
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taking by punishing negative results and reducing the rewards for suc-
cess.”180 
 In arguing that the Volcker Rule may serve an expressive function, 
this Article does not make the broad argument that the Rule crystal-
lizes the public’s disdain for proprietary trading in a manner that will 
pressure the banking community to change its business model. “Mak-
ing banking boring” has, to be sure, become a progressive mantra.181 
Some policymakers and scholars are struggling to find ways to reorient 
the mindset of those who manage or control depository institutions, so 
that they avoid excessive risk-taking unrelated to the core business of 
insured retail deposit-taking and commercial lending (i.e., “narrow” or 
“utility” banking).182 Such a norm, broadly speaking, is not enforceable 
through private action alone. Even if “safety and soundness” and “avoid-
ance of conflicts of interest” are worthy goals, they cannot be articu-
lated, publicized, and detected with the clarity and consistency that is 
necessary to marshal the public to shun offenders. 
 First, it is unclear whether Congress or the Agencies possess the 
reputational authority within the financial community to articulate 
such a norm. To have meaning within the banking community, a norm 
must be forged based on something approximating a consensus view 
                                                                                                                      
180 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 
Minn. L. Rev. 1779, 1787 (2011) (quoting Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 
77, 83 (2003)); see also Ramirez, supra note 179, at 381–82 (suggesting that “neither legisla-
tors nor judges are well suited to interpreting and integrating the best academic informa-
tion on corporate governance” and that “[t]he current system of corporate governance law 
looks nothing like emerging corporate governance science”). 
181 See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Making Banking Boring, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2009, at A23. 
182 Proposals for banking reform in other jurisdictions tend to rely on legal separation of 
deposit-taking and proprietary traded entities, rather than a complete bar against affiliation. 
A proposal advanced by the UK Independent Commission on Banking would achieve this 
goal by requiring segregation of traditional banking and proprietary trading activities and 
imposing higher capital requirements on the former. Indep. Comm’n on Banking, Final 
Report Recommendations 9–13 (2011) [hereinafter Vickers Report], available at http:// 
www.ecgi.org/documents/icb_final_report_12sep2011.pdf. Similarly, the Liikanen Report on 
reforming the European Union (EU) banking sector advocates segregation of proprietary 
trading activities (if they amount to a significant share of the bank’s business) into a separate 
investment banking affiliate within the bank holding company (“BHC”) structure that is 
subject to all the regulatory requirements (including capital adequacy and consolidated su-
pervision) pertaining to EU financial institutions. High-Level Expert Grp. on Reforming 
the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, Final Report, at iii (2012) [hereinafter Lii-
kanen Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_ 
expert_group/liikanen-report/final_report_en.pdf; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow 
Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could Solve the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. 
Regulation of Financial Conglomerates (Part II ), 31 Banking & Fin. Services Pol’y Rep., Apr. 
2012, at 1, 1–2 (arguing that banks controlled by conglomerates should maintain only tradi-
tional banking operations). 
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within the banking community. Second, even if the Agencies were able 
to build on such a consensus view, both the Rule itself and the rules 
promulgated thereunder attest to the difficulty of defining the kind of 
conduct promoted, tolerated, or discouraged under the putative norm. 
Third, and perhaps most important, there is little reason to believe that 
members of the trading community themselves have sufficient incen-
tive—whether reputational or commercial—to take specific action to 
enforce norms that undercut their profitability. Although “busybodies” 
may exist within the financial community, the isolated activity of a few 
gadflies is not likely to be sufficient to sustain a social norm. 
C. Expressivism and Market Structure 
 An expressive implementation of the Rule’s exemption for market-
making-related activities may nevertheless shape the structure of over-
the-counter markets in a way that direct legislation (such as Title VII of 
Dodd-Frank) cannot. In particular, market structure—that is, the man-
ner in which intermediaries in financial instruments deal with one an-
other and with end users—is the product of competitive forces and the 
tension among different categories of market participants.183 Individual 
market participants take the primary role in negotiating the structures 
to address those needs, whether by participating directly in the estab-
lishment of trading rules or customs or directing trades to markets that 
hold out the promise of fair and orderly markets. Regulators neverthe-
less play a critical role in eliciting the information necessary to under-
stand how markets work and how markets may better serve the interests 
of individual participants. Thus, the regulators may help generate 
norms around which market practices may coalesce. 
 The self-regulatory structure of U.S. securities and commodities 
markets may serve as a helpful, if imperfect, illustration of the role that 
regulators can play in the organic development of trading norms. The 
posture of Congress and the Commissions (the SEC and the CFTC) in 
such initiatives, including those relating to business conduct, frequently 
resembles that of a norm entrepreneur, rather than a rulemaker.184 In 
                                                                                                                      
 
183 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 73, at 89–111 (defining market structure by reference 
to how markets or market participants arrange trades, when and where they trade, how 
traders negotiate with each other, and how much transparency they permit). 
184 Some commentators view self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) as incrementally 
playing a quasi-governmental role and abandoning their representative character—particu-
larly in light of the consolidation of business conduct and financial responsibility regulation 
in FINRA. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Con-
sidered Government Agencies?, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 151, 159–70 (2008) (discussing the 
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the realm of sales practice and financial responsibility, for example, 
Congress has observed that attempts to proscribe unethical conduct at 
the legislative or agency level would require a “minute, detailed, and 
rigid regulation of business conduct by law” that would not keep pace 
with evolving practices in the marketplace.185 By contrast, federal fi-
nancial regulators can often lend significant support to self-regulatory 
organizations (“SROs”) in identifying and implementing rules for the 
reciprocal benefit of their members or to “balance the interests of one 
class of members . . . against the often conflicting interests of an-
other.”186 
 One simple example of such expressive rulemaking is reflected in 
the attempts of various agencies to carve out exemptions for market 
making in the context of federal margin rules.187 The concept of mar-
ket making, borrowed from the context of securities trading, was not 
directly apposite to open-outcry futures exchanges, in which floor trad-
ers provide significant liquidity to other market participants even 
though they have no obligation to post continuous quotations.188 Ac-
cordingly, without defining the term “market maker,” the Commissions 
                                                                                                                      
history of SROs and how FINRA became a tool for the SEC); William A. Birdthistle & M. 
Todd Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch 7 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ. Working 
Paper Series, No. 618, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2172935 (discussing the governmen-
talization of SROs); see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO 
Identity Crisis, 1 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 317, 324–31 (2007) (discussing how the SEC 
and Congress have sought to use SROs to further their regulatory goals). This Part focuses 
on the development of the trading and market rules of SROs, which have not been consoli-
dated and reflect a more aggressive balancing of regulatory and business interests. See infra 
notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
185 S. Rep. No. 75-1455, at 3 (1938). 
186 Dombalagian, supra note 184, at 319–22 (describing a concept of “reciprocal” and 
“partitive” rules of an SRO). In a similar vein, in over-the-counter markets, regulators have 
sought indirectly to influence market structure by embellishing express fiduciary duties or 
imposing implied duties—such as the duty of best execution or the duty not to charge 
excessive or fraudulent markups—in a manner that constrains the trading discretion of 
market intermediaries acting as principals or agents. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Is the 
Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1271, 1275–80 (1995) (describing such du-
ties); David A. Lipton, Best Execution: The National Market System’s Missing Ingredient, 57 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 449, 458–59 (1982) (describing the “symbiotic relationship” between 
a best execution rule and national market mechanisms designed to integrate competing 
market centers). 
187 Specifically, the Commissions (the SEC and the CFTC) sought jointly to define the 
concept of market maker on security futures exchanges in the context of clarifying eligibil-
ity for good faith margin in certain security futures transactions. Customer Margin Rules 
Relating to Security Futures, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,146, 53,152–53 (Aug. 14, 2002). 
188 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(38) (West 2012) (defining a 
market maker as someone who is willing to buy and sell on a “regular or continuous basis”). 
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permitted SROs to classify market participants as market makers based 
on a nonexclusive list of market-specific quantitative criteria.189 
 The evolution of specialist trading on organized markets is an-
other, perhaps more instructive example of how regulators influence 
market structure by articulating norms. The differentiated functions of 
the participants in an organized market—for example, specialist, mar-
ket maker, floor trader, broker—and the rules that govern their respec-
tive obligations and privileges are the product of decades of evolution 
in market structure; these rules in many cases predate U.S. securities 
regulation.190 The SEC has used its influence periodically to adjust the 
balance of power among specialists and other exchange members as 
necessary to require specialists to provide (or withhold) liquidity in re-
sponse to feedback from the trading community as to prevailing market 
conditions.191 
 In 1934, policymakers held “strong conflicting views” as to whether 
to ban specialist trading outright; specialists, who acted as agents for 
the execution of public orders on the floor of the exchange, were per-
ceived as abusing the instrumentalities of the market for their own 
speculative activities.192 Congress instead granted the newly created 
SEC authority to impose a “negative obligation” on specialists.193 The 
1937 “Saperstein Interpretation” described a specialist’s negative obli-
gation as “involv[ing] the exercise of judgment in appraising and 
                                                                                                                      
189 Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,153 (stating 
that exchanges or associations trading security futures may confer market maker status on 
a member based on the “percentage of its security futures trades on that exchange or asso-
ciation with persons other than registered market makers” or the percentage of the “ex-
change member’s revenue . . . derived from business activities or occupations from trading 
[in] listed financial-based derivatives”). 
190 See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 87, at 74–76 (describing the development of and the 
roles in the NYSE before the creation of the SEC). 
191 See, e.g., id. Joel Seligman has described, for example, the shift in allegiance of 
NYSE floor brokers and public broker-dealers in the 1930s away from the NYSE’s leader-
ship—which tended to be dominated by specialists and floor traders—to the SEC’s pro-
posed reforms as a means to restore the reputation of the NYSE. Id. Likewise, the posture 
of commission brokerage houses was also a key factor in the SEC’s efforts to reform the 
role of floor traders and specialists in the 1960s. Id. at 330–33. 
192 See, e.g., id. at 144–49 (describing the legislative and regulatory battle behind con-
temporaneous proposals to segregate trading and brokerage activities more generally); 
Simon & Trkla, supra note 72, at 241–47, 316 (describing the legislative battle behind the 
drafting of the original text of Section 11(b)). 
193 Exchange Act § 11(b), Former 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1934) (“If under the rules and 
regulations of the Commission a specialist is permitted to act as a dealer, or is limited to 
acting as a dealer, such rules and regulations shall restrict his dealings so far as practicable 
to those reasonably necessary to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly market.”), de-
leted by Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, § 6(2), Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 111. 
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weighing the many variables constituting or influencing the market at 
the time,” and exhorted the importance of considering whether trades 
are “reasonably calculated to contribute to the maintenance of price 
continuity and to the minimizing of the effects of temporary disparity 
between supply and demand,” in light of “the immediate condition of 
the market and of the specialist’s book” and the “adequacy of the spe-
cialist’s position to the reasonably anticipated needs of the market.”194 
 In the 1960s and 1970s, technology-enhanced competition from 
off-exchange market makers and regional exchanges and facilitated the 
diversion of trading activity—particularly, large institutional orders— 
away from the primary exchanges.195 In 1975, Congress granted the 
SEC more flexible authority to adopt both affirmative and negative ob-
ligations for specialists in order to induce the provision of greater li-
quidity while recognizing the strain placed on specialists by such com-
petition.196 The SEC originally proposed to exercise this authority to 
enforce specialists’ affirmative and negative obligations under an SEC 
rule; it ultimately imposed a requirement on exchanges to enforce such 
obligations themselves, while retaining the authority to order an ex-
change to cancel or suspend a specialist’s registration if the specialist 
failed to carry out its obligations.197 The SEC did not dictate how com-
                                                                                                                      
 
194 Exchange Act Release No. 1117, 1937 WL 31449, at *2 (Mar. 30, 1937) (providing 
the interpretation of David Saperstein, Director of the SEC’s Trading and Exchange Divi-
sion, of the uniform specialist rule adopted by the primary exchanges in 1935). 
195 Seligman, supra note 87, at 486–97 (citing the rise of institutional block orders; 
market maker competition; the complexity of the order, clearance, transfer, and settle-
ment process; and the rise of the Nasdaq automated quotation system as reasons for the 
migration of trading away from the primary exchanges). 
196 Exchange Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (2006) (granting the SEC authority to 
promulgate rules governing the registration of exchange specialists “as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest and for the protection of investors, to maintain fair and orderly 
markets, or to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a national market sys-
tem”); see also Simon & Trkla, supra note 72, at 317 (describing the amendments to Section 
11(b) as “consistent with the theme . . . that competition may mitigate the need for regula-
tion, balanced by the pragmatic view that competitive forces should be backstopped by the 
Commission’s oversight authority to ensure that true competition and its intended benefits 
occur”). Section 11A of the Exchange Act, added by the 1975 Amendments, set out more 
sharply defined policy objectives with respect to the national market system, including, 
among others, that “[i]t is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of inves-
tors and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure . . . an opportunity . . . for 
investors’ orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer.” 15 U.S.C.A § 78k-
1(a)(1)(C)(v) (West 2012); see also Simon & Trkla, supra note 72, at 318 (describing this pro-
vision as essentially an extrapolation of the specialist’s negative obligation). 
197 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1(a)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2012) (requiring every national securities ex-
change to adopt and enforce requirements “that a specialist engage in a course of dealings 
for his own account to assist in the maintenance, so far as practicable, of a fair and orderly 
market” and provisions “restricting his dealings so far as practicable to those reasonably 
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pliance with such obligations was to be measured or enforced and, ac-
cording to Joel Seligman, “did not once invoke this procedure” during 
the seven years following adoption of the rule.198 
 Evolving market structure demands in the ensuing years forced 
the role of specialists (and the SEC’s interpretation of their obligations) 
in a different direction. As technology enabled exchanges and alterna-
tive trading systems to automate the matching of orders, the need for 
specialists to act as agents has diminished.199 Many of these technologi-
cal initiatives—such as the gradual development of the Nasdaq Stock 
Market over the last quarter century and the automation of the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE)—were in fact encouraged by the SEC.200 
As a result, the relative informational advantages and other privileges of 
specialists, such as the ability to view orders before they enter the limit 
order book, have disappeared or been stripped.201 In response, ex-
changes have adopted quantitative metrics and initiatives for their spe-
cialists as a means to induce them to provide greater liquidity, while 
dropping the negative obligation imposed on specialists (who are now 
referred to as “designated market makers” on the NYSE).202 
 The analogy to SROs, of course, is imperfect: there is no SRO fo-
cused on developing trading norms for over-the-counter debt or deriva-
tives markets.203 Nevertheless, such markets are highly intercon-
nected,204 and the Commissions play a significant role in establishing 
                                                                                                                      
necessary to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly market”); see Simon & Trkla, supra 
note 72, at 298 (noting that rule 11b-1 “represents the first time that the Commission ex-
ercised the rulemaking authority it received in 1934 under Section 11(b)”); see also supra 
notes 67–70 (providing examples of such rules). 
198 Seligman, supra note 87, at 342. 
199 See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World: Trading 
Obligations and Privileges of Market Makers and a Private Right of Action, 7 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. 
& Com. L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 60–61), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032134 
(describing how technical developments have led to exchange rules that are less favorable 
to specialists). 
200 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-Regulation 
and the National Market System, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1069, 1082–89 (2005) (describing the 
emergence of the national market system and the SEC’s role in its development). 
201 Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC to 
Create a New NYSE Market Model, Exchange Act Release No. 58,845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379, 
64,379–80 (Oct. 24, 2008). 
202 Id. 
203 See Dombalagian, supra note 184, at 348–52 (advocating for SRO regulation of spe-
cific products, especially in the over-the-counter derivatives market). 
204 See, e.g., Monica Billio et al., Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in 
the Finance and Insurance Sectors, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 535, 536 (2012) (illustrating through 
various models how banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies, and hedge funds over the 
 
2013] Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, Financial Regulation, and Expressive Synergies 505 
expectations as to how markets should be structured. Throughout its 
involvement in market structure, the SEC staff has viewed its role as 
identifying the conflicting needs of different classes of market partici-
pants, articulating the appropriate mix of affirmative and negative ob-
ligations, and encouraging the development of market systems that 
eventually supplanted the most controversial aspects of specialization 
or market making.205 Critically, these initiatives were not attempts to 
adopt and enforce specific rules, but were intended to encourage SROs 
to adapt or build systems that channeled activity in (what the SEC per-
ceived to be) a more efficient configuration. Moreover, the SEC’s initia-
tives were reactive to changes in the trading practices and preferences 
of emerging market constituencies, such as alternative trading systems 
and institutional investors.206 
III. Tapping the Expressive Synergy: The Volcker Rule  
and Market Structure 
 In this Part, I propose an implementation of the Volcker Rule’s 
market making exemption that recognizes the service mission of mar-
ket making—providing liquidity in financial instruments designed to 
meet the needs of counterparties as efficiently and economically as pos-
sible.207 If the Rule represents the need for a “rebalancing of incen-
tives” in our financial system,208 the Rule and its prohibitions and ex-
emptions could be interpreted in a manner that aspires to that aim. In 
particular, I believe that the Rule may achieve such a rebalancing in the 
structure of over-the-counter markets. To be clear, it would be inappro-
priate, in the absence of express congressional intent, to co-opt the 
Rule to create a full-throated system of affirmative and negative obliga-
tions for market makers in swaps and security-based swaps. The en-
                                                                                                                      
past decade “have become highly interrelated, increasing the channels through which 
shocks can propagate throughout the finance and insurance sectors”). 
205 See Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-
Counter Stocks, 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 17, 86–102 (1986) (describing, as a former assistant 
director and a former chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, the SEC’s 
agenda in balancing competition between traditional exchanges and over-the-counter 
markets through a combination of regulation and automation). 
206 Stavros Gadinis, Market Structure for Institutional Investors: Comparing the U.S. and E.U. 
Regimes, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 311, 323–31 (2008) (describing the SEC’s efforts to address 
institutional investors’ concerns about market fragmentation and best execution through 
market structure reform). 
207 See infra notes 208–249 and accompanying text. 
208 Paul Volcker, Chairman, President’s Econ. Recovery Advisory Bd., Keynote Address 
at The Atlantic’s Economy Summit 10 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://atlanticlive.theatlantic.com/ 
AtlanticEconomySummit_PaulVolcker_with_SteveClemons.pdf. 
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forcement mechanisms established by the Rule may nevertheless offer 
useful synergies that can be exploited to shape the structure of over-
the-counter trading post-Dodd-Frank. 
 Section A shows that the metrics and internal controls used to en-
hance compliance with the market-making-related activities exemption 
could be designed to give nonbank market participants—nonbank 
market makers and dealers, and institutional or professional counter-
parties—greater leverage to negotiate for more competitive execution 
facilities.209 The collection (and limited publication) of statistics regard-
ing participation in such facilities, execution quality offered through 
such facilities, and competitiveness with other trading participants 
would establish these metrics as aspirational goals for the banking enti-
ties that participate in such facilities. Moreover, Section B illustrates 
that nonbank constituencies might use these statistics as leverage when 
negotiating rule changes or seeking to eliminate barriers to access to 
such systems, particularly if the Commissions (the SEC and the CFTC) 
are prepared to consider certain market structures to be presumptively 
in compliance with the Volcker Rule exemption.210 
A. Incorporating Market Structure Considerations into Volcker Rule Metrics 
 To the extent that market making is best understood in the con-
text of organized markets, one approach to implementing the market 
making exemption is to take into consideration the volume of trading 
that bank affiliates effect through the trading facilities available for a 
particular product.211 Although there is no express link between the 
Rule and the authority of the Commissions to regulate organized and 
over-the-counter markets, there is a natural synergy between the two 
Commissions’ authority to define market making and to define market 
structure. The manner in which market making is structured in over-
the-counter derivatives markets is of particular importance because the 
Commissions must consider how market makers will function within 
the new regulatory regime for swaps and security-based swaps.212 
                                                                                                                      
209 See infra notes 211–239 and accompanying text. 
210 See infra notes 240–249 and accompanying text. 
211 See infra notes 213–229 and accompanying text. 
212 See infra notes 230–239 and accompanying text. 
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1. Case Study: The Title VII Regime for Swaps and Security-Based 
Swaps 
 Rulemaking relating to swap markets under Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act serves as a concrete example of how an expressive reading of 
the Rule can directly shape the contours of market making in the over-
the-counter market.213 The Commissions are required to oversee the 
development of new market structures for swaps and security-based 
swaps as part of the Title VII reform of the over-the-counter derivatives 
market.214 Dealers and certain major participants in security-based 
swaps (based on the size of their positions, substantial counterparty ex-
posure, or leverage) are required to register with the SEC or the CFTC, 
as applicable, and to comply with capital, margin, business conduct, 
conflicts, position limit, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements.215 
Title VII generally requires such swaps or security-based swaps to be 
cleared through a registered clearing facility (if eligible), to be traded 
through a swap execution facility (if available), and reported for public 
dissemination.216 
 The provisions of Title VII governing swap intermediaries barely 
address the role of such intermediaries in market structure. Statutory 
terms such as “swap dealer” and “security-based swap dealer” suggest 
that there is a distinction between market making and dealing activ-
ity.217 For example, in defining the term “swap dealer,” the Commis-
                                                                                                                      
 
213 With limited exceptions, Title VII of the Act classifies most over-the-counter deriva-
tives transactions as swaps or security-based swaps. Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) of 
1974 § 1a(47), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining “swap” to include most 
options and executory exchanges of payments on various financial or economic interests, 
subject to exclusions for traditional securities, futures, physically settled forwards, and 
security-based swaps); Exchange Act § 3(a)(68), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(68) (West 2012) 
(defining “security-based swaps” to include all swaps based on a single security, a narrow-
based index, or a credit event relating to a single issuer or narrow-based group of issuers). 
214 For purposes of this Article, references to the term “swap” and any associated in-
struments, entities, intermediaries, or utilities include, unless otherwise noted, both CFTC-
regulated swaps and SEC-regulated security-based swaps. 
215 CEA § 4s, 7 U.S.C. § 6s (requiring swap participants to register with the CFTC and 
granting the CFTC the power to regulate swaps); Exchange Act § 15F, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-10 
(providing for the registration and regulation of security-based swaps dealers and partici-
pants by the SEC). 
216 CEA § 2(h), 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (swaps); Exchange Act § 3C, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3 (secu-
rity-based swaps). 
217 CEA § 1(a)(49), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49) (defining “swap dealer” to mean any person who 
“holds itself out as a dealer in swaps,” “makes a market in swaps,” “regularly enters into swaps 
with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account,” or otherwise “en-
gages in any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or 
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sions observed that a market maker is one who “routinely,” rather than 
regularly or continuously, stands ready to enter into a swap at the re-
quest or demand of a counterparty.218 Title VII, however, does not build 
upon those distinctions in a meaningful way. Much of the regulation of 
swap dealers, for example, focuses on traditional financial responsibility 
and business conduct regulation.219 The Agencies, moreover, have 
made little effort to date to bridge the concept of market making in the 
Rule with Title VII.220 
 The clearing and trade execution mandates of Dodd-Frank like-
wise do not contemplate a specific role for market makers as distinct 
from other dealers.221 The Commissions have crafted certain market 
structure rules in reliance on Title VII’s definition of “swap execution 
facility.”222 For example, to qualify as a swap execution facility, a trading 
facility must offer some “ability to execute or trade [swaps] by accepting 
bids and offers made by multiple participants” in order to promote 
                                                                                                                      
market maker in swaps”); see also Exchange Act § 3(a)(71), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(71) (provid-
ing an analogous definition of “security-based swap dealer”). 
218 Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,609 (May 23, 2012). The 
Commissions give the following examples of activity that would constitute “making a mar-
ket” in swaps— 
routinely: (i) [q]uoting bid or offer prices, rates or other financial terms for 
swaps on an exchange; (ii) responding to requests made directly, or indirectly 
through an interdealer broker, by potential counterparties for bid or offer 
prices, rates or other similar terms for bilaterally negotiated swaps; (iii) plac-
ing limit orders for swaps; or (iv) receiving compensation for acting in a mar-
ket maker capacity on an organized exchange or trading system for swaps. 
Id. 
219 For example, market participants (whether or not affiliated with a bank) deemed 
to be dealers or major participants in swap or security-based swap markets must comply 
with information walls and business conduct rules modeled on existing SRO rules for se-
curities and futures brokers and dealers. See generally CEA § 4s, 7 U.S.C. § 6s (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2010) (authorizing CFTC registration and regulation of swap dealers and major swap 
participants); Exchange Act § 15F, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-10 (West 2012) (authorizing SEC 
registration and regulation of security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap 
participants). 
220 See Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,618 n.272. As discussed 
above, the Commissions have merely required that an entity claiming the market-making-
related activities exemption must register as a “swap dealer” with the CFTC or “security-
based swap dealer” with the SEC “unless the person is exempt from registration or is en-
gaged in a dealing business outside the U.S., and is subject to substantive regulation in the 
jurisdiction where the business is located.” Id.; see supra note 99. 
221 See, e.g., CEA § 1a(49), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49) (including in the definition of swap dealer 
any person who “holds itself out as a dealer in swaps” or “makes a market in swaps”). 
222 Id. § 1a(50) (defining “swap execution facility” as a system that allows participants 
to execute swaps by accepting bids and offers). 
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price discovery.223 Under the proposed rules and interpretations, this 
statutory definition may generally be satisfied by an execution facility 
that offers a limit order book, the availability of multiple published 
quotations, or the availability of multiple participants willing to receive 
requests for quotes.224 There is no expectation, however, that particular 
market participants will provide liquidity to such systems on terms that 
are favorable to their users.225 
 More problematically, derivatives clearinghouses may have “the 
greater part of the discretion” vis-à-vis the Commissions to decide what 
kinds of products are eligible for standardized clearance (and therefore 
standardized trading).226 Their owners, who are likely to be larger 
commercial banks or other swap intermediaries themselves, have an 
incentive to resist broad application of the clearing requirement: all 
things being equal, spreads on standardized products are likely to be 
narrower than spreads on bespoke products, and standardized prod-
ucts provide fewer opportunities for exotic terms that could allow the 
dealer to profit at the counterparty’s expense.227 Because the manda-
tory centralized execution requirement applies only to swaps eligible to 
                                                                                                                      
223 CEA § 1a(50), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(50) (defining “swap execution facility”); Exchange Act 
§ 3(a)(77), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(77) (defining “security-based swap execution facility”). 
224 See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 1214, 1240–41 (CFTC Jan. 7, 2011) (setting forth CFTC Proposed Rule 17 C.F.R. § 37.9, 
which defines permitted execution methods for swaps); Registration and Regulation of Secu-
rity-Based Swap Execution Facilities, Exchange Act Release No. 63,825, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,948, 
10,953–56 (Feb. 28, 2011) (setting forth the SEC’s interpretation of the term “security-based 
swap execution facility” in Title VII). Unlike in the European Union, most trading in swaps 
and security-based swaps in the United States prior to Dodd-Frank has taken place through 
bilateral communications with or single-dealer platforms operated by banking organizations. 
76 Fed. Reg. at 10,951–52. 
225 See 76 Fed. Reg. at 1240–41 (setting forth CFTC Proposed Rule 17 C.F.R. § 37.10, 
which provides what swaps must be made available for trading but does not regulate the 
terms). 
226 E.g., Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Deriva-
tives Clearinghouses, 61 Emory L.J. 1153, 1186–88 (2012) (discussing when swaps need to be 
cleared and the discretion that is provided to swaps clearinghouses); Dan Awrey, Toward a 
Supply-Side Theory of Financial Innovation 55–58 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Se-
ries, Paper No. 44, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094254 (explaining when clearing 
requirements apply). 
227 Griffith, supra note 226, at 1193–1204. Similarly, they have resisted the requirement 
to trade through swap execution facilities (“SEFs”) to avoid the risk of adverse selection vis-
à-vis better informed counterparties. See, e.g., Letter from the Foreign Exch. Comm. to the 
Dep’t of the Treasury (Nov. 30, 2010) (No. TREAS-DO-2010–0006–0015 (arguing that the 
mandates for “central clearing and trading through [SEFs] will have the potential unin-
tended consequence of increasing systemic risk and possibly driving the market to other 
jurisdictions”). 
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be cleared,228 incentives to prevent the clearance of swaps will also indi-
rectly discourage centralized trading. Moreover, because a swap execu-
tion facility (“SEF”) may be owned and controlled by an even smaller 
consortium of banking organizations,229 there is the further risk that 
such facilities will be designed to suppress centralized trading in favor 
of off-exchange, off-facility bilateral transactions. 
2. Developing Volcker Rule Metrics That Relate to Swap Market 
Structure 
 A Volcker Rule compliance system that aims to improve the quality 
of market making services would consider a variety of factors in addi-
tion to the Agencies’ proposed revenue, risk, and customer-facing activ-
ity metrics. Such additional factors might include measures of the par-
ticipation of banking entities in swap execution or other trading 
facilities, competitiveness of quotations and actual trades, and readiness 
to supply liquidity. Not only would such measures encourage centraliza-
tion of trading and price discovery, but they would also promote the 
availability and use of standardized swap products, which are less sus-
ceptible to the kind of conflicts of interest that the Rule seeks to pro-
scribe.230 Such standardized products, moreover, may have the added 
benefit of decreasing systemic risk if they can be liquidated more easily 
or if default is backstopped by a clearinghouse.231 
 Although more elaborate statistics may be developed for these 
purposes, some simple examples will suffice. To the extent that it is de-
sirable to centralize trading in SEFs, banking entities could be required 
to report the percentage of trades (or percentage of notional volume of 
                                                                                                                      
228 CEA § 2(h)(8)(a), 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Exchange Act 
§ 3C(h)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3(h)(1) (West 2012). 
229 Proposed Regulation MC, for example, allows any participant in a security-based 
swap execution facility (together with its related persons) to own or exercise up to twenty 
percent of its voting interest. 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 65,931 (Oct. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 242); see also Rena S. Miller, Cong. Research Serv., R41715, Conflicts of 
Interest in Derivatives Clearing 11 (2011), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41715_ 
20110322.pdf (citing concern that the Agencies “have not gone far enough in limiting 
dealers from gaining monopolistic control over clearinghouses, [SEFs], and exchanges”). 
230 See Thompson, supra note 92, at 343–58 (evaluating the tools market regulators 
have at their disposal and how best to use them). 
231 Scholars continue to debate the merits of central clearing of swaps and security-
based swaps under Title VII. Compare, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Case for Derivatives 
Clearinghouses, 101 Geo. L.J. 445, 461–63 (2013) (discussing clearinghouses’ ability to ab-
sorb risk), with Yesha Yedav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 
Geo. L.J. 387, 393–95 (2013) (arguing that clearinghouses will increase systemic risk be-
cause they bear the economic risk of the swap but not the legal tools to mitigate the risk). 
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trades) executed through SEFs relative to total trades eligible for trad-
ing through such facilities. A more detailed breakdown of such activity 
would classify execution facilities by the number of quoting participants 
as well as the degree of affiliation between the entity and the facility. 
Competitiveness could be measured by reference to the activity of such 
entities in individual SEFs. For example, regulators could require dis-
closure of the percentage of trades (or percentage of notional volume 
of trades) represented by an entity in each facility, and the notional-
volume-weighted frequency at which the entity appears in the best dis-
played quote or offers the topping quote in such facility. 
 In this regard, it is important for regulators not just to devise met-
rics, but also to solicit comment from counterparties and end users as 
to what metrics would improve the quality of the services market mak-
ers provide in the over-the-counter market.232 For example, the Com-
missions could compel the publication of a limited subset of these sta-
tistics for purposes of facilitating evaluation of market maker services. 
The SEC has required exchanges, market centers, and broker-dealers 
to publish statistics about their execution quality.233 This, in turn, has 
created incentives for exchanges to incorporate such metrics into their 
regulation of specialists and market makers.234 Naturally, it would not 
be appropriate to require firms to publish the revenue and risk statistics 
that the Agencies have confidentially requested in the proposed rules. 
Aggregate statistics on market share, market competitiveness, and li-
quidity provision would go a long way, however, to helping the public 
understand how these markets function and how the quality of service 
may be improved. 
 Critics are likely to contend that the collection and publication of 
such statistics may create further confusion as to the scope of permissi-
ble market making activities and thereby undermine the effectiveness 
of internal controls. Moreover, incorporating market-specific statistics 
into the Rule’s enforcement program might be perceived as an in-
fringement of the right of customers to choose the counterparty with 
whom and the facilities through which they enter into swaps and secu-
                                                                                                                      
232 The collection and reporting of such data would mainly serve the expressive func-
tion described above. Regulators would propose them as guidelines for market making, 
and the trading community—including banking entities and nonbank constituencies—
would latch on to the metrics that gave them the most leverage vis-à-vis bank dealers. See 
supra notes 171–182 and accompanying text (discussing the role of law in discovering and 
publicizing norms). 
233 Regulation NMS Rules 605–606, 17 C.F.R. § 243.605–.606 (2012). 
234 See supra notes 68–69. 
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rity-based swaps.235 Conversely, the Rule’s supporters may argue that 
some of the proposed statistics may encourage greater risk taking, to 
the extent that execution facilities foster greater competition among 
bank market making affiliates and between bank market making affili-
ates and other market makers.236 
 These considerations, however, only underscore the importance of 
treating the additional proposed metrics as part of an ongoing infor-
mation-gathering and norm-establishing process.237 The additional sta-
tistics I suggest are no more dispositive of whether a banking entity is in 
compliance with the Volcker Rule exemption than the statistics pro-
posed by the Agencies.238 Such metrics, however, would create an at-
mosphere in which banking entities have an incentive to negotiate with 
nonbank constituencies—be they rival traders or customers—to spon-
sor and participate in execution facilities that offer some opportunity 
for competitive bidding. What is critical is that the Agencies signal to 
nonbank constituencies a willingness to address their market structure 
concerns within the context of the market-making-related activities ex-
emption—consistent with the expressivist view that law can encourage 
the development of new norms by discovering and publicizing consen-
sus views or intense minority preferences.239 
                                                                                                                      
235 Certain end users of swaps—nonfinancial companies that use swaps to hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk—may elect not to clear transactions with other swap market par-
ticipants. CEA § 2(h), 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)–(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (swaps); Ex-
change Act § 3C(g)(1)–(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3(g)(1)–(2) (West 2012) (security-based 
swaps). The clearing mandate nevertheless applies to swap dealers, major swap partici-
pants, and certain other financial companies (e.g., financial intermediaries and certain 
private funds or commodity pools). CEA § 2(h)(7)(c), 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(C); Exchange 
Act § 3C(g)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3(g)(3). 
236 Some of the proposed factors might well be at odds with revenue and risk meas-
ures. For example, a banking entity that regularly charges wider spreads might report a 
better Spread P/L, but might not appear as competitive as firms that report leaner Spread 
P/Ls because they provide more liquidity when needed. 
237 Cf. Whitehead, supra note 5, at 70 (suggesting that the Agencies implement the 
Rule narrowly at the outset, and introduce additional restrictions or prohibitions “[o]ver 
time, with additional data—and a clearer picture of the impact of the new regulation” so 
that banks and regulators have an opportunity “to assess the impact of the new require-
ments” and “to fine tune the detailed metrics that are likely to be used in separating pro-
prietary from permissible activities”). 
238 See supra notes 120–125 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule’s statistics re-
quirements). 
239 See supra notes 150–170 and accompanying text (describing the different expressiv-
ist theories). 
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B. Encouraging the Design of More Competitive Over-the-Counter Markets 
 The Volcker Rule, more broadly, could be implemented in a man-
ner that favors the creation of trading facilities that address the imbal-
ance between bank and nonbank trading activity. As Luigi Zingales has 
argued, one “beneficial side effect of the Glass-Steagall Act” was to 
fragment the banking sector and thereby foster “healthy competition 
between commercial banks and investment banks.”240 To the extent 
that a significant percentage of trading activity in financial instruments 
is concentrated in a handful of banks as a result of the dismantling of 
Glass-Steagall,241 an argument could be made that the Rule should seed 
larger market structure initiatives to encourage the growth of the non-
bank financial sector.242 
 A second step toward improving liquidity and price discovery 
would therefore be to signal a willingness to consider whether transac-
tions executed in certain qualified execution facilities would presump-
tively satisfy the market-making-related activities exemption. In particu-
lar, the Commissions could work with market operators—not just for 
swaps, but for a variety of corporate debt and other over-the-counter 
instruments—to devise rules that enable nonbank financial companies 
(“NFCs”) to compete effectively with established banking organizations, 
notwithstanding their smaller size and lack of established customer or 
counterparty relationships. Such incentives may be necessary to induce 
the participation of smaller firms that may not wish to or may not be 
able to raise the capital necessary to compete with established commer-
cial and investment banks. 
 One approach might be to encourage the development of trading 
rules—whether as part of the rules of a formal trading facility or as 
business conduct principles for an SRO charged with overseeing the 
over-the-counter market—that permit nonbank financial counterpar-
ties to step ahead of or share in transactions that would otherwise be 
executed by a banking affiliate. It might be excessive for such rules to 
require that execution facilities guarantee parity or precedence for 
                                                                                                                      
240 Luigi Zingales, A Capitalism for the People: Recapturing the Lost Genius 
of American Prosperity 51–52 (2012). 
241 Id. at 52–65. 
242 Whitehead, supra note 5, at 61–63. Naturally, increasing the amount of liquidity 
provided by nonbanks—particularly liquidity resulting from speculative trading by private 
hedge funds—could make it more difficult to monitor the amount of risk within the finan-
cial system. Id. at 61–68 (discussing risks from the outsourcing of credit risk by banks to 
hedge funds). 
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NFCs with respect to bank-affiliated dealers;243 the Commissions might 
nevertheless signal a willingness to allow banking entities presumptively 
to establish compliance with the Rule for transactions effected through 
qualifying markets that incorporate similar concepts. 
 Another approach would be to broaden opportunities for smaller 
NFCs to act as “quoting participants” in such systems.244 As one scholar 
has noted, many NFCs do not currently have the regulatory infrastruc-
ture, capital, access to liquidity, and relationships necessary to assume 
the market making function performed by bank affiliates.245 For such 
entities, a regulatory definition of “quoting participant” that considers 
the focus of their trading activity, rather than their potential to contrib-
ute significant liquidity, would ensure some degree of competitiveness. 
For example, a swap execution facility could deem an NFC to fulfill the 
“regular or continuous basis” element of the market-maker definition, 
as the Commissions have permitted in other contexts, by considering 
whether the member has effected a certain percentage of its trading 
activity through a specific facility, or by requiring that a large majority 
of such exchange member’s revenue is derived from trading a particu-
lar set of financial instruments through any such facility.246 
 To complement these initiatives, the Agencies would do well to 
encourage the emergence of a critical mass of NFCs able to participate 
as quoting participants. One straightforward way to create such an in-
dependent, adequately capitalized investment banking sector capable 
of providing the kind of financial intermediation currently provided by 
commercial banks is to facilitate the divestiture of trading affiliates 
from bank holding companies (“BHCs”) (or in the case of BHCs that 
                                                                                                                      
243 Such rules would effectively function as the converse of rules that guarantee a spe-
cialist a proportion of each order when its quote is equal to the best price on the ex-
change. See Competitive Developments in the Options Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 
49,175, 69 Fed. Reg. 6124, 6129 (Feb. 9, 2004). 
244 See Whitehead, supra note 5, at 46. Shifting trading to nonbank financial companies 
(“NFCs”)—such as hedge funds—might result in less regulatory oversight of such activity. As 
Charles Whitehead notes, “even if proprietary trading is no longer located in banks, it may 
now be conducted by less-regulated entities that affect banks and banking activities.” Id. 
245 See, e.g., Duffie, supra note 97, at 6. But see, e.g., Letter from Dennis Kelleher et al., 
Better Markets, Inc., to the Agencies 23 (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
SECRS/2012/February/20120221/R-1432/R-1432_021312_105537_519233431691_1.pdf 
(arguing that “it is irrational and baseless to assume that the revenue and profits from 
market making will be insufficient to attract capital and competition to that activity”); 
Transcript of CFTC Volcker Rule Roundtable 112–16 (May 31, 2012), http://www.cftc. 
gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/transcript053112.pdf (statement 
of John Parsons) (discounting the argument that nonbanks will not provide risk manage-
ment services that banks will not be permitted to provide under the Rule). 
246 See supra note 187–189 and accompanying text. 
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once were independent investment banks or insurance companies, to 
divest their depository institutions).247 From a regulatory perspective, 
therefore, regulators may wish to ensure that the path to “debanking” is 
free from obstacles248 and that capital, leverage, and other financial 
responsibility requirements applicable to such holding companies will 
take into account the cost of forgoing express federal assistance.249 
IV. The Volcker Rule in Context 
 Any implementation of the Volcker Rule is likely to face legal chal-
lenges.250 Industry participants, for example, are likely to cite the mag-
nitude of the costs associated with the Rule, including both the compli-
ance costs required by the Rule itself, as well as the indirect burden on 
end users of financial products and financial service providers resulting 
from lost trading opportunities or off-shore migration of trading activ-
ity, as a justification for reconsideration of any combination of final 
rules adopted by the Agencies.251 As compared to the proposed rules, 
                                                                                                                      
 
247 Of course, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) retains the discretion 
to designate such investment banks or insurance companies as systemically important fi-
nancial institutions (“SIFIs”) based on the extent and nature of their transactions and 
relationships with other SIFIs; their leverage, off-balance-sheet exposures, and importance 
to the economy; the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix 
of their activities; and other risk-related factors. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (Supp. IV 2010) (con-
ferring authority on the FSOC to require supervision and regulation of certain NFCs). The 
FRB, moreover, may impose additional capital requirements and quantitative limits on the 
activities of such SIFIs. Id. § 1851(a)(2). 
248 12 U.S.C. § 5327. One key obstacle is Dodd-Frank’s “Hotel California” provision, 
which ensures that investment banks-turned-BHCs, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley, will not escape supervision as SIFIs even if they divest their insured U.S. depository 
institutions. Id. (providing that any entity that was a BHC having total consolidated assets 
equal to or greater than $50 billion as of January 1, 2010 and that received financial assis-
tance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program shall be treated as an FRB-supervised 
NFC). Clarifying how the FRB and the FSOC apply the Hotel California provision to in-
vestment banking units of financial holding companies and BHCs would be an effective 
signal as to whether such spinoffs will be encouraged or discouraged. 
249 The loss of such access might increase the funding costs of entities that wish to be-
come independent investment banks, but only to the extent that their creditors and coun-
terparties believe that implicit federal assistance will not realistically be available to non-
BHCs. One recent study suggests that SIFIs continue to enjoy significant subsidies (up to 
eighty basis points in funding costs) from such implicit guarantees, notwithstanding higher 
capital requirements and new liquidation regimes. Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di 
Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions 1–5 
(IMF Working Paper, No.12-128, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/ 
wp12128.pdf. 
250 See supra notes 1–29 and accompanying text. 
251 Cost/benefit challenges in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have be-
come an important focus of industry groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
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the proposals I have advanced modestly increase direct compliance 
costs (by requiring banking organizations to maintain additional met-
rics), but significantly liberalize proprietary trading (particularly if one 
or more safe harbors may be created for qualifying trading facilities). 
Moreover, they encourage trading in more liquid standardized instru-
ments cleared through a clearinghouse, which arguably promotes fi-
nancial stability.252 
 Nevertheless, one may challenge the proposal on the grounds that 
the Rule does not confer sufficient flexibility and discretion on the 
Agencies to develop an expressive implementation of its provisions that 
serve the additional policy objectives I have suggested. The Rule, like 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, is ostensibly grounded in the twin mis-
sion of preserving the safety and soundness of individual banks and of 
avoiding the conflicts of interest between lending and traditional secu-
rities activities;253 the legislative history of the Rule, the Financial Stabil-
ity Oversight Council’s study of proprietary trading, and the invocation 
of these purposes within the text of the Rule make this much clearer. 
Accordingly, this Part closely examines the structure of the Rule in the 
light of its antecedents—the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999—to find a basis for such a proposal.254 
 By way of background, Glass-Steagall’s restrictions on proprietary 
trading by banks and bank affiliates were contained in four key provi-
sions. Sections 16 and 21 (which remain in force today) generally pro-
hibit the conduct of deposit taking and proprietary trading in most se-
curities within the same business entity,255 whereas Sections 20 and 32 
                                                                                                                      
 
the Business Roundtable, in stymying regulatory efforts by the Commissions (the SEC and 
the CFTC). See Bruce R. Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis, 30 Yale J. on Reg. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4–21), http://ssrn.com/ab- 
stract=2139010 (describing such challenges). Bruce Kraus and Connor Raso believe that 
industry groups seek to defeat these regulatory efforts by blurring the boundary between 
economic analysis and policy choice in financial regulation. Id. In this regard, they argue 
that the SEC “should affirm its substantial and long-standing expertise in financial eco-
nomics, and insist on the agency’s right, derived from that expertise, to discern and define 
the boundary between economics analysis and policy choice.” Id. (manuscript at 1); see also 
Greene & Potiha, supra note 158, at 301–02 (discussing the possibility of off-shore migra-
tion of trading activity). 
252 See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing this argument). 
253 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 
(Supp. IV 2010)). 
254 See infra notes 263–286 and accompanying text. 
255 As amended, Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act provides that 
[t]he business of dealing in securities and stock by [a national banking] asso-
ciation shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock 
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, 
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formerly restricted affiliations and interlocking directorates between 
depository institutions and entities principally engaged in securities 
underwriting and dealing.256 Gramm-Leach-Bliley replaced the latter 
restrictions with a framework of “functional regulation,”257 under which 
entities engaged in underwriting, dealing, and other activities that are 
“financial in nature” could affiliate with certain “well managed” and 
“well capitalized” BHCs, subject to oversight by the appropriate func-
tional regulator and with limited FRB supervision.258 
 When reading the Volcker Rule against this history, three themes 
are notable. First, Section A shows that the Rule’s various exemptions 
were clearly designed to accommodate the positive externalities, as well 
as the risks and rewards, of proprietary trading by banks and banking 
affiliates.259 Second, Section B argues that the Rule confers significant 
administrative discretion on the Agencies to articulate how the scope of 
                                                                                                                      
and in no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite 
any issue of securities or stock. 
12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Section 21 makes it unlawful 
[f]or any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other simi-
lar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or 
distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, 
bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to 
any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits. 
Id. § 378(a)(1). 
Although Section 16 refers specifically to national banks, the prohibitions of the Glass-
Steagall Act were extended to state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System 
by 12 U.S.C. § 330 (2006). The limitations and restrictions in Section 16 as to “dealing in, 
underwriting and purchasing for its own account” do not apply to certain U.S. govern-
ment, agency, municipal, and government-sponsored enterprise securities, or to certain 
marketable corporate debt securities and Canadian government and municipal securities. 
See id. § 24 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Consistent with the practice of financial regulators, 
such activities are hereinafter referred to as “bank-eligible activities,” and all other activi-
ties prohibited by Section 16 are referred to as “bank-ineligible activities.” 
256 More specifically, Section 20 formerly barred affiliations between banks and any en-
tity “engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution 
. . . of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities.” Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 
No. 73-66, § 20, 48 Stat. 162, 188–89 (formerly codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377) (repealed 
1999). Section 32 prohibited any “officer or director” of a member bank from serving as 
an “officer, director, or manager” of any entity “engaged primarily in the business of pur-
chasing, selling, or negotiating securities” except as permitted by the FRB. Id. § 32 (for-
merly codified at 12 U.S.C. § 77) (repealed 1999). Although the language in the two sec-
tions differs slightly— “engaged principally” in Section 20 versus “engaged primarily” in 
Section 32—the analysis in this Part focuses exclusively on the interpretation of the “en-
gaged principally” restriction in Section 20. 
257 See infra notes 262–286 and accompanying text. 
258 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)–(l) (Supp. IV 2010). 
259 See infra notes 262–286 and accompanying text. 
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permitted activities should be implemented as the financial industry 
and financial markets evolve.260 Third, Section C argues that the Rule 
preserves and reinforces the role and mission of federal securities and 
derivatives regulators in interpreting and enforcing its provisions con-
sistent with the concept of “functional regulation.”261 
A. The Agencies Must Be Able to Consider More Than Safety and Soundness 
and Conflicts of Interest 
 Unlike Glass-Steagall, the Volcker Rule unquestionably permits the 
Agencies to consider factors other than safety and soundness and con-
flicts of interest when carrying out their rulemaking obligations.262 
Courts reviewing the administration of Glass-Steagall have often treated 
these two goals as the exclusive focus of the separation of deposit-taking 
and dealing activities; despite advocacy by academic commentators and 
policymakers to broaden implementation of Glass-Steagall,263 courts 
have struck down interpretations that deviated from those stated man-
dates.264 As the legislative draftsmen behind the Rule note, however, 
the Rule exemptions are designed to permit the Agencies to consider 
the positive externalities of bank proprietary trading in addition to 
safety and soundness and conflicts of interest.265 
                                                                                                                     
 Discussions of the judicial interpretation of Glass-Steagall prohibi-
tions typically begin with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in 
 
260 See infra notes 287–321 and accompanying text. 
261 See infra notes 322–346 and accompanying text. 
262 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B)–(C) (providing market making and hedging exceptions). 
263 For example, some scholars argued for Glass-Steagall reform on the grounds that its 
narrow focus on safety and soundness and the judicial preoccupation with “subtle hazards” 
did not permit regulators to consider other important policy objectives, such as efficient 
provision of services and the risks posed by undue concentration of resources. Robert S. 
Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall Have for Today’s Financial World?, 95 Banking L.J. 
404, 411 (1978) (arguing that financial reform should focus on undue concentration of re-
sources, unfair competition, and efficiency); James R. Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to 
Higher Ground: The Hazardous Subtleties of “Subtle Hazards” in Bank Regulation, 4 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 21, 22–23 (1995) (critiquing subtle hazards); see also infra notes 267–269 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of the term “subtle hazards”). 
264 See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 360, 364 
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Citicorp), 
839 F.2d 47, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1988); see also infra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing 
these cases). 
265 See, e.g., Merkley & Levin, supra note 10, at 542–48. Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl 
Levin argue that these exemptions provide commercial banks with a better ability to serve 
clients than Glass-Steagall. Id. at 538–39 (“The Glass-Steagall Act’s separation was over-
inclusive because its ban on all securities activities at commercial banks swept in truly client-
oriented activities that could be managed by developments in securities and banking law.”). 
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Investment Company Institute v. Camp.266 In Camp, the Court famously ar-
ticulated the “apparent” policy reasons for prohibiting commercial 
banks from engaging in investment banking activities or affiliating with 
investment banks.267 In addition to the “obvious danger” that banks 
might imprudently invest their own assets in securities or other specula-
tive investments,268 the Court noted the more “subtle hazards” that the 
bank’s “salesman’s interest” in the activities of its underwriting and 
dealing affiliates might “create new temptations” to engage in unsound 
lending activity or divert the facilities of commercial banking “into 
speculative operations” as a result of the aggressive and promotional 
character of the investment banking business.269 
 The severity of Glass-Steagall’s prophylactic firewall led a number 
of scholars to question whether deeper motivations underlay the Act, 
beyond the twin concerns of safety and soundness and conflicts of in-
terest.270 After all, the Act’s specific restriction on “securities” activities 
seemed somewhat out of place to the extent that many equally risky 
activities remained open to insured depository institutions after the 
Act’s passage.271 One scholar has suggested that the purpose of such a 
prohibition may have been to channel bank activity to underserved sec-
tors of the economy.272 Other scholars have suggested that the bar may 
simply have been designed to subvent the investment banking industry, 
which was decimated by the Great Depression.273 The courts neverthe-
less clipped federal financial regulators’ limited attempts to extend the 
scope of Glass-Steagall beyond these two statutory purposes.274 
                                                                                                                      
 
266 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971). 
267 Id. at 629–30. 
268 Id. at 630–32. 
269 Id. For example, an affiliation with a securities firm might create pressure on a 
bank to extend credit to its affiliates, to the companies whose shares were underwritten or 
dealt in by such affiliates, or to customers for the purpose of purchasing such securities. See 
id. at 632–33. The bank might also succumb to pressure to recommend such securities to 
bank depositors or to induce the public generally to invest in such securities in reliance on 
its reputation for “prudence and restraint.” Id. at 632. 
270 Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist 
Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 672, 691–94 (1987); Jona-
than R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of 
Glass-Steagall, 33 Emory L.J. 1, 19–20 (1984). 
271 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 270, at 680–83; Macey, supra note 270, at 11–13. 
272 See Langevoort, supra note 270, at 691–98. 
273 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 57 (1984); Macey, supra note 270, at 15–21. 
274 Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 68–69. For example, the FRB sought to interpret the “engaged 
principally” language to impose a market share limitation on the bank-ineligible activities 
of Section 20 affiliates. See Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 900 F.2d at 364. Although a bank’s market 
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 Unlike Glass-Steagall, the Volcker Rule invites the Agencies to bal-
ance the risks of proprietary trading against the public benefit of finan-
cial services.275 The Rule’s approach to delimiting the activities of enti-
ties affiliated with a bank, for example, is more nuanced than Glass-
Steagall’s “engaged principally” test. First, the Rule focuses exclusively 
on the intent, design, and nature of the activities in which banking enti-
ties may engage, as opposed to the quantitative impact that such trading 
could have on the entity or its affiliates.276 Second, the Rule specifically 
considers the benefits provided to customers, clients, counterparties, 
and the financial markets, not just the “subtle hazards” posed to banks 
by their affiliation with other financial services providers.277 
 The language of the Rule thus is distinguishable from Glass-
Steagall in that it qualitatively defines the types of dealing activity in 
which a banking group may engage (e.g., underwriting, market mak-
ing, and risk mitigating hedging) without specifically imposing any 
quantitative limitations on such activities. Indeed, other provisions of 
Dodd-Frank enhance the Agencies’ ability to regulate the quantitative 
impact of such trading.278 More significantly, the Rule gives the Agen-
cies supplemental discretion to impose “additional capital require-
ments and quantitative limitations” regarding permitted activities to 
protect the safety and soundness of banking entities engaged in those 
activities.279 
                                                                                                                      
 
share was in theory irrelevant to its safety and soundness, independent investment banks 
(who would benefit from market share restrictions on the investment banking activities of 
commercial banks) argued that existing revenue share tests were inadequate to police the 
“engaged principally” requirement because banks could manipulate revenue by padding 
the activities of their affiliates with bank-eligible activities. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit nevertheless struck this limitation down on the theory that “Con-
gress was not concerned about market share” and, “by using the term ‘engaged princi-
pally,’ . . . indicated that its principal anxiety was over the perceived risk to bank solvency 
resulting from their over-involvement in securities activity.” Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 68. 
275 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1) (Supp. IV 2010) (allowing market making activities). 
276 See, e.g., Liikanen Report, supra note 182, at 84–85 (noting that the Rule, unlike 
Glass-Steagall, attempts to make “fine distinctions” between “proprietary” and “customer-
driven” activities and between “high-risk” and “low-risk” activities). 
277 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B). 
278 Section 171 of Dodd-Frank both extends risk capital requirements to BHCs (for 
which capital adequacy was previously determined pursuant to FRB guidelines) and super-
imposes minimum leverage capital requirements (tier 1 capital to total assets) on existing 
capital requirements of depository institutions and BHCs. Id. § 5371. Similar requirements 
obtain with respect to holding companies of broker-dealers under Section 618 of Dodd-
Frank. Id. § 1850a. 
279 Id. § 1851(d)(3). Moreover, the Agencies possess similar authority to impose such 
capital requirements and quantitative limitations on systematically significant NFCs under 
FRB supervision. Id. § 1851(a)(2). 
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 Finally, the nature of the Rule’s exemptions suggests that some 
consideration must be given to the value of the financial services pro-
vided by banking affiliates. The exemption for investments in small 
business investment companies,280 for example, is certainly one moti-
vated by considerations of the public interest, as is the exemption for 
government securities (particularly to the extent that it continues to 
include mortgage-backed securities of government-sponsored enter-
prises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).281 Congress was, more-
over, surely aware that the permitted activities are inherently risky and 
pose significant conflicts of interest.282 Otherwise, it would have been 
redundant to subject the exemptions to additional limitations on mate-
rial conflicts and material exposures to high-risk assets or high-risk trad-
ing strategies.283 
 If anything, a broader reading of the Rule may well be necessary, 
given the history of Glass-Steagall, if the Rule is to have any lasting sig-
nificance. Enthusiasm for enforcing the Glass-Steagall firewall waned as 
confidence in financial responsibility and business conduct regulation 
improved284 and competition intensified among domestic and interna-
                                                                                                                      
 
As a corollary, the Rule should be viewed as complementing, rather than supplement-
ing, the Agencies’ initiatives to shore up domestic and international capital adequacy stan-
dards. Federal financial regulators have already undertaken a revision of the market risk 
capital requirements applicable to trading assets. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market 
Risk, 76 Fed. Reg. 1890, 1890 (OCC et al. proposed Jan. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, & 325). Moreover, Basel III, an international regulatory standard 
for bank capital and stress testing, will introduce liquidity coverage ratios and stable fund-
ing ratios with a view to reducing the likelihood of further liquidity crises. See Basel Comm. 
on Banking Supervision, Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 1 (2010), available at  http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs188.pdf. 
280 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(E). 
281 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A) (Supp IV 2010). 
282 156 Cong. Rec. S5906 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) 
(confirming Sen. Evan Bayh’s understanding that the market-making-related activities ex-
emption “would allow banks to maintain an appropriate dealer inventory and residual risk 
positions, which are essential parts of the market making function” and without which “mar-
ket makers would not be able to provide liquidity to markets”). 
283 See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2). 
284 See, e.g., Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Hold-
ing Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750, 
68,755 (Dec. 30, 1996) (“Bank holding companies have demonstrated over the past nine 
years that they are able to manage the risks of investment banking, and section 20 subsidi-
aries operate as separately capitalized subsidiaries of a bank holding company, outside the 
control of any affiliated bank and therefore outside the protections of the federal safety 
net. Section 20 subsidiaries must register as broker-dealers and remain subject to the capi-
tal regulations of the Securities [&] Exchange Commission.”). But see Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consoli-
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tional commercial banks285 and between commercial banks and non-
bank financial services firms.286 Enforcement of the Rule will likewise 
require the dedication of significant regulatory resources and may well 
fall into desuetude as regulatory budgets contract and safety and 
soundness concerns recede. The information-gathering and informa-
tion-sharing apparatus required for implementation of the Rule, by con-
trast, can continue to help shape the evolution of the market structure 
of over-the-counter markets by helping regulators calibrate the role of 
market makers in a manner that improves the function of such markets. 
B. Courts Should Defer to Agencies’ Interpretation of Activities Exemptions 
 The Volcker Rule should also be read to confer broad administra-
tive discretion with respect to the meaning of terms such as “underwrit-
ing and market-making-related activities” and “risk-mitigating hedging 
activities,” as well as the variety of metrics employed to measure them. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s purposive reading of Glass-Steagall in 
Camp, as early as the 1980s scholars observed a shift toward greater ju-
dicial deference to the federal bank regulators’ deregulatory moves.287 
                                                                                                                      
 
dation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 437–75 (arguing that the creation of 
universal banks was unlikely to improve the efficiency or profitability of the U.S. financial 
services industry, that financial conglomerates posed a significant potential threat to the 
safety and stability of the industry, and that bank regulatory policies were inadequate to 
control the potential risks of financial conglomerates). 
285 See, e.g., Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Note, An International Perspective on Domestic Banking 
Reform: Could the European Union’s Second Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way the United States 
Regulates Its Own Financial Services Industry?, 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1715, 1738 (1999) (dis-
cussing the widespread belief among executives of U.S. financial institutions in the 1990s 
“that other countries are leaving the United States behind as the only developed country that 
has not lifted barriers segregating financial services”); Frank M. Tavelman, Comment, Ameri-
can Banks or the Glass-Steagall Act—Which Will Go First?, 21 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1511, 1519–20 (1992) 
(supporting the proposition that “[m]any levels of the federal government [at the time] 
recognize[d] American banking’s disadvantage relative to foreign banks”). 
286 See, e.g., Jill M. Hendrickson, The Long and Bumpy Road to Glass-Steagall Reform, 60 
Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 849, 860–61 (2001) (explaining the competition banks received from 
the creation of money market mutual funds); Smoot, supra note 263, at 27–28 (discussing 
the rise in competition both in lending and deposits from nonbanks starting in the 1960s); 
Wilmarth, supra note 284, at 239–42 (discussing the emergence of money market mutual 
funds and active commercial paper markets in the 1970s as a direct competitive threat to 
traditional deposit-taking and corporate lending activities). 
287 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 270, at 718 (noting a significant shift in tone be-
tween the Court’s 1971 interpretation of the Glass-Steagall bar in Camp and its 1981 deci-
sion in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, and ob-
serving that “the consequence of [judicial] deference has been to lessen the impact of the 
Act”); Macey, supra note 270, at 34 (arguing that judicial “deference to administrative ex-
pertise by an agency” contributed to “a telling defeat” of substantive portions of Glass-
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Such deference is particularly notable in the context of the “activity” 
analysis under Glass-Steagall, under which courts gave latitude to bank 
regulators to expand the type and quantity of permitted activities in 
bank-ineligible securities notwithstanding the significant jurisdictional 
implications.288 Congress has furthermore encouraged judicial defer-
ence to the federal financial regulators in recent years, both by crafting 
mechanisms for interagency resolution of disputed terms and by rely-
ing on joint rulemaking exercises among competing agencies.289 
 Beginning in the 1980s, courts showed considerable deference to 
the FRB’s program of permitting commercial banks to compete with 
investment banks and mutual fund companies through increasingly 
narrow interpretation of the scope of prohibited activities.290 The 
change in courts’ attitudes was first observed in a 1981 Supreme Court 
case, Board of Governors v. Investment Company Institute (ICI ), in which the 
Institute challenged a FRB regulation permitting BHCs and nonbank-
ing subsidiaries to act as investment advisers to closed-end investment 
companies.291 In ICI, the Court deferred to the FRB’s reasonable de-
termination of the appropriate method for restricting conflicts of in-
terest between a bank and its affiliates.292 Scholars viewed the case as 
                                                                                                                      
Steagall and that the “defeat indicates the inherent difficulty of enforcing this kind of leg-
islation generally”). 
288 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 270, at 718–19 (discussing the reasoning behind the 
Court’s decisions which strayed from Camp). 
289 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 27d (2006) (providing the FRB with the power to challenge the 
CFTC’s regulation of hybrid products); Exchange Act 15(j), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(j) (West 
2012) (providing the FRB with express authority to challenge the SEC’s regulation of hy-
brid products). 
290 See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust I ), 
468 U.S. 137, 139–40 (1984); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Inv. Co. Inst. 
(ICI ), 450 U.S. 46, 49 (1981). 
291 ICI, 450 U.S. at 48–50. 
292 Id. at 64–68 (reframing Camp as a decision that “squarely relied on the literal lan-
guage” of Glass-Steagall). The Court observed that, unlike an open-end investment com-
pany (i.e., a mutual fund), a closed-end investment company does not issue shares after its 
initial organization and does not redeem its shares; its shareholders must sell their shares 
in the marketplace. Id. at 51. Thus, a closed-end investment company need not “constantly 
issue securities to prevent the shrinkage of assets.” Id. The Court further noted that the 
regulation at issue prohibited banks from underwriting or selling the stock of a closed-end 
investment company and that it was therefore reasonable to conclude that an advising 
bank (1) would not be affiliated with an entity “constantly involved in the search for new 
capital to cover the redemption of other stock,” and (2) would not be subject to promo-
tional pressure. Id. at 67. Accordingly, the Court deferred to the FRB’s reasonable inter-
pretation that a bank could associate with a closed-end investment company without violat-
ing the policies underlying Glass-Steagall or the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”). 
See id. at 64–68, 78 (distinguishing the Court’s holding in Camp, in which the mutual fund 
at issue was the functional equivalent of an open-end investment company). 
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heralding a shift away from the purposive analysis of “subtle hazards” in 
Camp toward accommodation of administrative line drawing.293 
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even as courts continued to en-
gage in a “plain meaning” analysis of the scope of bank-ineligible secu-
rities under Glass-Steagall,294 they increasingly deferred to the bank 
regulators’ determination that particular securities activities did not 
constitute “underwriting,” “dealing,” “distribution,” or “public sales” 
that were bank-ineligible under Section 16 or Section 20.295 For exam-
ple, courts upheld administrative action permitting banks and their 
affiliates to participate in private placements,296 discount brokerage297 
(even when coupled with investment advice),298 and best-efforts un-
                                                                                                                      
293 Langevoort, supra note 270, at 701–04; Macey, supra note 270, at 21–25 (discussing 
regulations and court decisions after Camp and arguing that the power to administer Glass-
Steagall switched to the regulatory authorities). 
294 Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 139–40 (holding that commercial paper is a “security” 
under Glass-Steagall and that the FRB therefore could not permit a state commercial bank 
to enter into the business of selling third-party commercial paper). 
295 Although Section 20 affiliates were permitted to engage in bank-ineligible activities, 
the analysis of bank-eligibility is nevertheless important because Section 20 affiliates could 
engage in bank-eligible activities without limitation. See supra notes 255–256 and accompa-
nying text. 
296 In 1981, in Bankers Trust I, the Supreme Court rejected the FRB’s determination 
that commercial paper is not a “security” for the purposes of Glass-Steagall. The Court 
reasoned that the FRB’s “functional analysis,” which focused on marketplace realities, was 
at odds with the Act’s plain meaning. Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 140–43. The Court further 
noted that the FRB’s failure to make an administrative determination as to whether Bank-
ers Trust’s commercial paper placement program constituted underwriting rendered its 
legal arguments “post hoc rationalizations . . . entitled to little deference.” Id. at 143–44. 
On remand, instead of relying on a narrow definition of “security,” the FRB determined 
that Bankers Trust’s activities did not constitute “underwriting,” drawing a distinction be-
tween private and public placement of commercial paper. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust II ), 807 F.2d 1052, 1054–55 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). Furthermore, the FRB found that Bankers Trust’s private 
placement program did not trigger the “subtle hazards” associated with public offerings. 
See id. at 1066–70. On appeal, in Bankers Trust II, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the FRB’s 
determination that Bankers Trust’s private placement of commercial paper did not consti-
tute underwriting, distribution, or public sale of securities. See id. at 1062–66; see also id. at 
1066 (concluding that the FRB’s distinction between private and public placement activi-
ties “meshe[d] well with the congressional goal of eliminating the ‘subtle hazards’ of con-
flicts of interest and abuse of fiduciary relationships in banking”); Smoot, supra note 263, 
at 56–57 (describing how Bankers Trust modified its commercial paper program after the 
Court’s decision in Bankers Trust I ). 
297 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Schwab), 468 U.S. 
207, 217 (1984). 
298 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (NatWest), 821 F.2d 
810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1987); J.P. Morgan & Co., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 810, 810–12 (1987). 
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derwriting.299 In these cases, courts relied on the regulators’ articulated 
justifications and operational controls for permitting such activities and 
rarely invoked “subtle hazards” as the sole basis for overturning admin-
istrative action.300 
 Courts also permitted bank regulators to interpret Section 20’s 
“intrinsically ambiguous” language301 with a view to increasing the 
quantity of bank-ineligible activities in which an affiliate could engage 
without running afoul of the “engaged principally” requirement.302 For 
example, the FRB raised the cap on gross revenues from the bank-
ineligible activities of Section 20 affiliates from 5% (beginning in 
1987)303 up to 10% by 1990304 and eventually 25% in 1996.305 In up-
holding a challenge to the 1998 Citigroup Order,306 the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that “[w]here a statute can reasonably be understood to in-
vite an agency to draw a quantitative proportional line, it is rare that a 
court can reject the agency’s selection of one percentage over an-
other.”307 By contrast, when the FRB sought to restrict the market share 
of Section 20 affiliates in connection with the relaxation of limitations 
                                                                                                                      
299 Bankers Trust New York Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 829, 835 (1989); see Bankers Trust 
II, 807 F.2d at 1054–55 (holding that the placing of commercial paper for clients was con-
sistent with Glass-Steagall); see also Lori Anne Czepiel, Note, Best Efforts Underwriting: Does 
Glass Steagall Allow It?, 7 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 557, 558 (1988) (discussing the federal 
government’s leanings toward allowing commercial banks to conduct best efforts under-
writing and arguing against it). 
300 2 Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation § 9.02C (2d ed. Supp. 2012-
1); Smoot, supra note 263, at 77–79. 
301 Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 52, 63; see Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. v. Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., 195 F.3d 28, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (granting Chevron deference to “any 
reasonable Board interpretation” of this language). 
302 Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 474–75 (1987); Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 138, 141 (1987). 
303 Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 473. 
304 Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751 (1989). 
305 Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Com-
panies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750, 68,752 
(Dec. 30, 1996). 
306 Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in 
Nonbanking Activities (“1998 Citigroup Order”), 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985, 985 (1998). The 
1998 Citigroup Order permitted Travelers Group to acquire Citigroup, Inc., an existing 
BHC, under the BHCA, even though Travelers’ insurance underwriting business and the 
investment banking activities of its subsidiary, Salomon Smith Barney, would not have been 
consistent with the BHCA. Id. at 1016. 
307 Indep. Cmty. Bankers, 195 F.3d at 36. The Independent Community Bankers of Amer-
ica questioned the FRB’s discretion to interpret the “engaged principally” requirement 
solely by reference to “a purely quantitative proportional line” capping revenue share from 
impermissible activities and “thereby to disregard other indicia of risk and/or the absolute 
level of sales volume.” Id. 
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on revenues, the D.C. Circuit in 1990, in Securities Industry Association v. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, struck down the proposed 
market share limitations for lack of any grounding in the text of Sec-
tion 20.308 
 It is arguable, moreover, that since Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Congress 
has stacked the deck in favor of administrative resolution of the mean-
ing of contested terms through interagency consultation and dispute 
resolution. As part of the major financial market reforms of the last fif-
teen years, Congress has required joint or coordinated rulemaking 
among federal financial regulators in a number of areas, including cus-
tomer privacy,309 the regulation of single stock and narrow-based index 
futures,310 hybrid products,311 and swaps and security-based swaps,312 
among other instruments. Moreover, perhaps in a bid to avoid jurisdic-
tional disputes to be waged through proxies, Congress has created di-
rect mechanisms by which federal agencies may challenge one an-
other’s jurisdictional determinations, with judicial resolution offered 
only as a last resort.313 
 The permitted activities exemptions of the Volcker Rule are drafted 
in a manner that compels administrative discretion. First, whereas Glass-
                                                                                                                      
308 Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 900 F.2d at 364. 
309 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (requiring coordination, consis-
tency, and comparability of rulemaking by the applicable financial regulators under the 
privacy provisions of Title V). 
310 See Exchange Act § 3(a)(55)(D), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(55)(C), (D) (West 2012) 
(requiring the Commissions jointly to adopt rules allocating regulatory jurisdiction over 
certain “narrow-based securities ind[ices]”); Exchange Act § 7(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78g(c)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (requiring the Commissions jointly to adopt rules, 
if delegated, pursuant to authority from the FRB, establishing margin requirements for 
security futures products). 
311 7 U.S.C. § 27d (2006) (imposing on the CFTC the requirement to consult with the 
FRB with respect to hybrid products that are “predominantly” banking products under 7 
U.S.C. § 27c(b)); Exchange Act § 15(j), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(j) (imposing on the SEC the 
requirement to consult with the FRB in connection with the imposition of broker-dealer 
registration with respect to any “new hybrid product”). 
312 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (Supp. IV 2010) (discussing generally the allocation of au-
thority and mutual consultation requirements between the Commissions with respect to 
swaps, security-based swaps, and relevant financial intermediaries). 
313 To resolve certain specific interagency disputes between banking regulators and the 
SEC or the CFTC, Congress has directed courts to focus on the appropriateness of pro-
posed rulemaking “in light of the history, purpose, and extent of regulation” under federal 
banking laws and federal securities or commodities law, “giving deference neither to the 
views of the Commission nor the Board.” 7 U.S.C. § 27d(c) (granting the FRB the author-
ity to challenge CFTC rulemaking over hybrid products that are “predominantly” banking 
products under 7 U.S.C. § 27c(b)); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(j) (West 2012) (granting the FRB 
the authority to challenge the imposition of broker or dealer registration requirements 
with respect to any “new hybrid product”). 
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Steagall sought only to distinguish principal and agency trading, the 
Rule requires the Agencies to make more nuanced distinctions among 
types of proprietary trading—such as “dealing” versus “market mak-
ing”314—and relies on the Agencies’ expertise to determine the relevant 
criteria in the absence of any legislative history or established meaning 
for such terms.315 Similar efforts to classify or articulate the obligations 
of market professionals, particularly in the context of supervising the 
implementation of such classifications or obligations by organized mar-
kets or SROs, have been referred to the Agencies due to their special 
competence and have not been struck down as vague or overbroad.316 
 In addition, the exemption’s latitudinous reach to activities “re-
lated” to market making implies even greater administrative defer-
ence.317 For example, the Supreme Court has held that the FRB’s pre- 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley authority to determine whether certain activities 
were “so closely related to banking . . . as to be a proper incident 
thereto” under § 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) 
was “entitled to the greatest deference.”318 In interpreting § 4(c)(8), 
                                                                                                                      
314 See supra notes 62–102 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of “market 
making”). 
315 Cf. Exchange Act § 15(j), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(b) (authority to define technical terms). 
316 See, e.g., Shultz v. SEC, 614 F.2d 561, 571 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE) Rule 8.7 against a challenge for vagueness because the af-
firmative obligation it imposes on CBOE market makers “could not be fully spelled out in 
a series of specific prohibitions,” because a “market maker is a professional who has volun-
tarily assumed this delicately-balanced and often very profitable position,” and “[b]y regis-
tering as a specialist, he has agreed to act only within certain parameters according to cal-
culations which require his sophisticated judgment”); Schonholtz v. Am. Stock Exch., 505 
F.2d 699, 700 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (refusing to read into AMEX Rule 170, which 
states the affirmative duty of the specialist to “assist in the maintenance, insofar as rea-
sonably practicable, of a fair and orderly market,” an “obligation to insure a market in 
which float would be adequate” in the face of an inadequate float that allegedly persisted 
for two years); Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (dismissing challenge to 
the adequacy of NYSE Rules governing specialists as required under Exchange Act Rule 
11b-1(a)(2) on the ground that “determination of whether a rule governing specialists on 
the Exchange is adequate or inadequate raises issues calling for the exercise of judgmental 
factors which are within the special competence of the SEC and outside the conventional 
experience of judges and juries”). 
317 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2010) (codifying the Volcker Rule 
exemption for “underwriting or market-making-related activities”), with 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78g(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (carving an exception for “activities as a mar-
ket maker or underwriter”). 
318 ICI, 450 U.S. at 56 (interpreting § 4(c)(8) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)). 
The D.C. Circuit elaborated that § 4(c)(8) “commits it to the Board to apply a standard of 
such inherent imprecision . . . that a discretion of almost legislative scope was necessarily 
contemplated.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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the FRB reserved the right to consider “any . . . factor that an applicant 
may advance to demonstrate a reasonable or close connection or rela-
tionship of the activity to banking.”319 Gramm-Leach-Bliley granted the 
FRB equally broad authority to identify activities that are “incidental” or 
“complementary” to a financial activity.320 
 Second, to the extent that the Rule’s exemptions require an in-
quiry into whether transactions are designed to make markets, to meet 
“near term demands” of third parties, or with the intent “to profit from 
short-term price movements,” the quantitative inquiry compelled by 
such provisions—whether by virtue of simple line drawing or more so-
phisticated metrics—should rarely be disturbed by a court. Moreover, 
although judicial review of the arbitrary or capricious nature of SEC/ 
CFTC cost-benefit analysis or the discriminatory or anticompetitive im-
pact of proposed rulemaking remains appropriate,321 courts should be 
willing to recognize the difficulty of quantifying the externalities result-
ing from financial market activity, as discussed above. 
C. Functional Regulation Should Permit Consideration of Market Structure 
 Courts should also respect the philosophy of “functional regula-
tion” espoused in Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which confers authority on the 
primary financial regulatory agency322 of each banking affiliate to 
adopt rules implementing its restrictions.323 The Commissions (the 
SEC and the CFTC)—which have exclusive responsibility for regulating 
the activities of most securities and derivatives dealers within a banking 
organization under the Rule324—traditionally view financial responsibil-
ity regulation as part of their overall obligation to ensure the integrity 
                                                                                                                      
319 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 806 
( Jan. 5, 1984). 
320 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A)–(B) (permitting nonbank affiliates of a financial hold-
ing company to engage in such activities). But see Am. Bar Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
430 F.3d 457, 470–71 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying step one of the Chevron doctrine to affirm 
invalidation of a decision of the Federal Trade Commission that attorneys engaged in the 
practice of law are “financial institutions” based on the enumeration of activities that are 
“financial in nature” in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3)). 
321 See, e.g., Clement v. SEC, 674 F.2d 641, 646–47 (7th Cir. 1982) (vacating a proposed 
CBOE rule change and remanding to the SEC for consideration of the anticompetitive 
and discriminatory impact on market making activity). 
322 See 12 U.S.C. § 5301(12) (defining “primary financial regulatory agency”). 
323 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2010). Other amendments to the BHCA, 
however, expand the authority of the FRB to undertake group-wide supervision of finan-
cial holding companies and their affiliates, notwithstanding functional regulation by the 
SEC, CFTC, OCC, FDIC, or state insurance regulators. Id. § 1844(c). 
324 Id. § 1851(b)(2). 
2013] Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, Financial Regulation, and Expressive Synergies 529 
of financial markets and the protection of participants in those mar-
kets. As a result, the Commissions should enjoy a modicum of discre-
tion to implement the Volcker Rule’s expressive directives in a manner 
that complements (and is consistent with) their other statutory obliga-
tions under Dodd-Frank and federal securities and commodities law. 
                                                                                                                     
 The approach of the Rule with respect to the role of the Agencies 
builds upon the framework established by Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Al-
though Gramm-Leach-Bliley is hailed for permitting banking groups to 
offer a range of financial services to their clients (e.g., commercial 
banking, investment banking, and insurance),325 arguably its most sig-
nificant achievement is balancing group-wide oversight of financial in-
stitutions against the need to ensure that subject matter regulators re-
tain the authority to regulate the conduct of entities within their 
respective spheres of activity.326 Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the SEC 
and the federal banking regulators vied over the authority to regulate 
the securities activities of depository institutions, particularly with re-
spect to sales practices and other business conduct.327 Although banks 
successfully rebuffed the SEC’s attempt to regulate the securities activi-
ties of depository institutions,328 Congress, nevertheless, took steps to 
reconcile disparities in regulation between banks conducting securities-
related activities and brokerage firms.329 
 
 
325 Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Law Easing Bank Laws, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
5, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/05/business/congress-passes-wide-ranging-bill-
easing-bank-laws.html (quoting officials supportive of the relaxation of the Glass-Steagall 
restrictions). But see Kenneth A. Carow et al., Safety-Net Losses from Abandoning Glass-Steagall 
Restrictions, 43 J. Money Credit & Banking 1371, 1392–93 (2011) (finding evidence that the 
removal of product line restrictions has resulted in increased bank bargaining power, which 
can increase customer funding costs and reduce capital market access, especially vis-à-vis 
credit-constrained customers); Vincent DiLorenzo, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Deregulated Markets, 
and Consumer Benefits: A Study of the Financial Services Modernization Experience, 6 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 
& Pub. Pol’y 321, 346–74 (2002) (questioning whether the expected benefits of “[e]n-
hanced competition and efficiency” following Gramm-Leach-Bliley were realized). 
326 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (allocating regulatory 
authority between the FRB and the relevant functional regulators with respect to regulated 
nonbank subsidiaries within a BHC). 
327 A Section 20 affiliate of a bank that engaged in securities activities remained subject 
to Exchange Act registration as a broker-dealer. 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(a) (2012). 
328 Am. Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (vacating SEC Rule 
3b-9). Under Rule 3b-9, the SEC proposed to narrow the scope of “banks” excluded from 
the definition of “broker” in Section 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5), 
so that the SEC could regulate depository institutions that earned “transaction-related 
compensation” from brokerage services, whether as an accommodation for existing bank-
ing customers or resulting from public solicitation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (2006). 
329 For example, Congress conferred the authority to promulgate rules on all dealers 
in government and municipal securities (including both traditional securities firms and 
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 Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the SEC and other federal and state 
financial regulators were given express authority to regulate most securi-
ties activities of bank affiliates.330 Banks were required to push out most 
of their securities and commodities activities to an appropriately regis-
tered broker-dealer affiliate.331 Although the FRB retained some re-
cordkeeping and examination powers over such affiliates,332 the Com-
missions became responsible for regulating the activities of firms 
engaged in securities and commodities dealing respectively, while state 
insurance regulators remained responsible for regulating the activities 
of bank affiliates operating as insurance companies.333 Most notably, the 
FRB was not given the authority to impose capital requirements on such 
functionally regulated affiliates.334 
 Dodd-Frank generally reinforces this principle of functional regu-
lation by expanding it to derivatives-related activities, such as over-the-
counter interest-rate swaps, currency swaps, credit-default swaps, and 
other instruments in which banks have commonly dealt. The Lincoln 
Amendment (also known as the “mini-Volcker Rule”) forces a U.S.-
insured depository institution, in order to maintain eligibility for fed-
eral assistance,335 to push out all swaps activity (other than bona fide 
hedging activities and certain traditional bank activities)336 to a swaps 
                                                                                                                      
bank divisions) on the Secretary of the Treasury and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board, respectively, with enforcement powers delegated to the dealer’s primary regulator. 
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(a)(34), 78o-3, 78o-5 (West 2012). Congress also required bank regu-
lators to adopt sales practice regulations for banks engaged in government securities deal-
ing. See Government Securities Sales Practices, 62 Fed. Reg. 13,276, 13,276–77 (Mar. 19, 
1997) (providing joint rulemaking by federal bank regulators adopting sale practice rules 
for banks dealing in government securities that are substantially similar to the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Business Conduct and Suitability Rules). 
330 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(4). 
331 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(5)–(6) (defining “bank” and exempting “bank” from the 
meaning of dealer for certain permissible activities); see S. Rep. 106-44, at 10–11 (1999) 
(describing “push out” provisions). 
332 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)–(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). The FRB’s power to compel 
reports and conduct examinations of the functionally regulated subsidiaries of a BHC were 
enhanced by Section 604 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
333 Id. § 1844(c)(4). 
334 Id. § 1844(c)(3). 
335 15 U.S.C. § 8305(a) (Supp. IV 2010). 
336 The Lincoln Amendment permits banks to enter into hedging and other similar 
risk-mitigation activities directly related to the insured depository institution’s activities—
which include interest rate, currency, and related index derivatives to hedge the bank’s 
lending and payment systems activities. Id. § 8305(d)(1). Banks are also permitted to en-
gage in swaps activities related to their traditional role in underwriting U.S. government, 
agency, and municipal securities. Id. § 8305(d)(2). Moreover, the Lincoln Amendment 
permits banks to enter into credit-default swaps (e.g., on individual debt or asset-backed 
securities, or baskets of or indices based on a group of asset-backed securities) as long as 
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entity within a BHC under FRB supervision.337 This structure is similar 
to the proposals in the Vickers and Liikanen reports for UK and EU 
banking sector reform respectively.338 The consequence, however, is 
that regulation of most market making activity (other than traditional 
government securities activity) is housed in special purpose affiliates 
regulated by the Commissions.339 
 The Volcker Rule, moreover, is structured as a coordinated rule-
making of the Agencies, under which the Commissions have the exclu-
sive authority to adopt rules governing those banking entities under 
their oversight.340 Although the Agencies must “jointly” adopt any regu-
lations under the Rule with respect to insured depository institu-
tions,341 the Commissions are each entitled exclusively to issue regula-
tions with respect to banking entities for which they are the primary 
financial regulatory agency.342 This agency power is subject only to the 
requirement that they “consult and coordinate” with the federal bank-
ing agencies and each other, “as appropriate, for the purposes of assur-
ing, to the greatest extent possible, that such regulations are compara-
ble and provide for consistent application and implementation.”343 The 
purpose of such consultation is to avoid “providing advantages or im-
posing disadvantages to the companies affected” and “to protect the 
safety and soundness” of banking entities and FRB-supervised NFCs.344 
 This allocation of functional responsibility raises two questions. 
Firstly, to what extent should the Commissions devote their compara-
tively scarce examination and enforcement resources to enforcing a 
Rule that has the ostensible purpose of protecting insured deposits at 
an affiliated depository institution for which the Agencies themselves 
are not responsible? Congress’s failure to appropriate sufficient funds 
                                                                                                                      
they are cleared through an SEC-registered clearing agency or CFTC-registered derivatives 
clearing organization. Id. § 8305(d)(3). 
337 Id. § 8305(c). Swaps entities, for this purpose, include “swap dealers” and “major 
swap participants” regulated by the CFTC, and “security-based swap dealers” and “major 
security based swap participants” regulated by the SEC. Id. § 8305(b). 
338 See supra note 182. 
339 See 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (effectively forcing insured banking institutions to create sepa-
rate swaps affiliates which would not be subject to the banking authorities). 
340 Although the FRB has rulemaking authority under the Rule with respect to insur-
ance affiliates, the Rule maintains Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s deference to state insurance law, 
unless a particular law, regulation, or written guidance of the state is “insufficient to pro-
tect the safety and soundness of the banking entity or of the financial stability of the Unit-
ed States.” 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(F)(ii) (Supp. IV 2010). 
341 Id. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i)(I). 
342 Id. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i)(III)–(IV). 
343 Id. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
344 Id. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
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to the Commissions to enforce compliance would almost certainly ren-
der enforcement of the Rule ineffective with rules not critical to their 
mission.345 More saliently, to what extent should they have compara-
tively greater freedom to shape the contours of an exemption almost 
exclusively under their jurisdiction346 to advance their own regulatory 
mission? It could not violate the statutory requirement of “coordina-
tion, consistency, and comparability” in rulemaking if the Commissions 
chose to interpret the exemption for market-making-related activities to 
achieve a broader set of regulatory goals, including the role of ostensi-
ble “market makers” in the Title VII market structure. 
 The implications of the framework for functional regulation for 
interpreting the exemptions of the Rule are significant. Given this 
structure, it would be very odd to read the rule as solely concerned with 
safety and soundness or bank conflicts of interest. After all, why put 
“functional regulators” such as the SEC, the CFTC, and state insurance 
regulators—who are charged with ensuring that their registrants are 
able to satisfy the claims of customers, clients, and counterparties—in 
the position of policing brokerage, dealing, and underwriting activity 
under a Rule designed to protect the safety and soundness or the repu-
tation of the insured depository institutions at the financial holding 
company’s core? If this delegation of authority to the Commissions has 
any meaning, the Commissions must be able to interpret the provisions 
relevant to their spheres of activity in a manner that creates positive 
externalities for the marketplace, as long as they do not jeopardize the 
safety and soundness of the core depository institutions. 
Conclusion 
 It is difficult to predict whether the Volcker Rule will survive the 
political gamesmanship of the coming four years, let alone endure the 
tumultuous sixty-six years that Glass-Steagall reigned. The Agencies, 
and more specifically the Commissions, nevertheless have a window of 
                                                                                                                      
345 See, e.g., Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global 
Corruption Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 1093, 1117 (2012) (“The SEC has 
consistently, and with good reason, asserted that it has inadequate resources to address all 
the increased demands placed upon it, particularly by growth in the securities industry 
and by Dodd-Frank.”); Joel Seligman, Lecture, Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for Inde-
pendent Regulatory Agencies, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (2011) (“The broader an agency’s 
jurisdiction, the more likely it is to lack the resources or focus to address all appropriate 
priorities.”). 
346 With the exception of bank divisions regulated as government securities dealers or 
municipal securities dealers, the exemption applies exclusively to securities or derivatives 
dealers under SEC/CFTC oversight. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B). 
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opportunity to empower participants in over-the-counter markets to use 
the Rule as leverage in negotiating the regulatory and operational 
structure of those markets over the next few years. An expressive im-
plementation of the Rule’s market making exemption not only will 
help to differentiate the prospective roles of bank-affiliated dealers, 
nonbank financial companies, and end-users of financial instruments 
(and thus create constituencies with an interest in the survival of the 
exemption), but also may improve the long-term vitality and competi-
tiveness of financial markets. 
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